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LETTERS OF CREDIT UNDER THE PROPOSED UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED
NINETY percent of the financing of international sales transactions is
accomplished by means of the letter of credit.1 And the device now appears
with increasing frequency in domestic trading as well.- Recognizing the com-
mercial importance of the letter of credit, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws have attempted to codify letter of credit lay. in Article 5 3 of
1. This estimate appears in HOXTm. INTERNATiON;AL RUL.ES o:z Lurmns oF CnF.MT
(ECA mem. 1950), and was substantiated by interviews of officials of leading banks in
New York City, conducted by the YALE LXw JtURNA.L, June and Selotember, 1952 (here-
inafter cited as IxTERviEws). See also Note, Reised Inte-national Rules for Doctwet:-
tary Credit. 65 HAEy. L. REv. 1420 (1952).
Approximately nine-tenths of letter of credit financing is done in connectimn with in-
ternal trade. Ixmnviwmvs. And the device is being ued extensively in the Mutual
Security Program. C6lnrunication to the YI.n L.xw JLo'x.% AL from Mr. Oscar Gray,
member of the legal staff of the Department of State, dated November 15, 1952, in Yale
Law Library. !
2. Extension on wider scales into domestic financing has been predicted and urged.
See Llewellyn, So;': Advantages of Letters of Credit, 2 J. or Bus., U. or Cui. 1, 6
(1929). And, in fact, domestic use has increased since the end of World War II,
especially when a seller is dealing with a buyer for the first time. Frequent use of such
credits is made in automobile financing. IzTmEviEws. See VAnD & HAPrIEL., BANNr
CRnrrs A r' Acmr.!xcEs (3d ed. 1943) (hereinafter cited as WARD & I-Lrx;LP). A
growing practice is for the recipient of an international trade letter of credit to use his
rights under that credit as a basis to secure domestic financing through another, or as it
is called "secondary," letter of credit. See id. at 140-6; Kingdom of Sweden v. New York
Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 443, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 789 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
3. The first tentative draft of an Article dealing with letters of credit was submitted
to the American Law Institute and National Conference on Uniform State Laws at their
joint meeting, February 9-11, 1946 (hereinafter cited as 1946 FEn. Dnmrr). A second
draft, little changing the first, came out in October of 1046 (hereinafter cited as 1946
Ocr. DRAFT).
In May, 1949, a printed draft of the Code with comments appeared, treating letters
of credit in Article 4. A.ssacANx LAw IN-sIrrrs, NAT. CoNF. OF Co.1ntisszo:mF-.s On
UmFoRm STATE LAws, ComknmciAL CoDE art. 4 (May, 1949 Draft) (hereinafter cited
as 1949 DRAFT). The "proposed final" draft of the Code of Spring, 1950, submitted to
te Conference May 18-20, 1950 (hereinafter cited as 1950 Dr,%Fr), contained the law on
letters of credit in Article 5. A second "pror osed final" draft of the Code, containing a
slightly revised version of the 1950 DRAF'r of Article 5, was submitted to the National
Conference at its meeting of May 16-19, 1951 (hereinafter cited as 1951 DrAr). A quick
revision of Article 5 was undertaken in the Summer of 1951. A considerably revised tent
of Article 5 appeared in what was supposed to b- the final text edition of the CCde and v, as
approved by the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws at a
joint meeting sponsored by the American Bar Association in the Fall of 1951. The final
edition containing official comments to all the articles-and for the first time the final
comments to Article 5--was printed in September, 1952. (This final version, Ainum,.cA
LAw IxsTrrUTz, NAT. CON-F. OF Comiissxo:xrs ON UzziF0,i STATE LwAs, UmF0on!
COMME ICIAL CODE: OlFiciA DRAFT (text and comments ed. 1952), is hereinafter cited
as FiqxA. DR.AFr or simply by section numbers.)
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the proposed Uniform Commercial Code.4 Their proposals warrant careful
analysis and discussion.
Operations of Letters of Credit
The letter of credit 1 is in principle a simple device.0 Typically, the seller
of goods to a foreign buyer will ask for its use as the method of payment.7
The buyer is required to engage a bank in his own country to promise,
without right of revocation, to honor drafts drawn by the seller, within a set
time, up to a stipulated amount.8 In banking parlance the buyer is the
4. The Code has been the subject of much literature, not all of it unheated. See for
general discussion, Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (f) Commercial Code Should Not
Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952) ; Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales:
Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950) ; Gilmore, The Uniform Commnereial
Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952). Article 5 as it appeared
in the Spring Draft of 1950 was briefly appraised in McLaughlin, The Letter of Credit
Provisions of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAlv. L. Rgv. 1373 (1950).
FINAL DRAFT (text without comments ed.) was treated more extensively in Harfield,
Article 5-Trade Without Tears, or Around Letters of Credit in 17 Scelions, (19521
Wis L. REv. 298.
5. "[A] commercial letter of credit may be defined as a letter wherein the writer
agrees to pay a designated amount of money in cash in exchange for specified shipping
documents." Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441, 96 N.Y.S.2d
779, 787 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
6. For brief surveys of the evolution of letters of credit financing, see DAvis, Tm
LAW RELATING TO COMMERcIAL LErrERs OF CRiIT 1-11 (1939) (hereinafter cited as
DAVIS); GuTTERIlXG, TiE LAW OF BANKER'S COMMERCIAL CREDITS 1-15 (1932) (herein-
after cited as GuarERIDmE) ; WAM & HARFiELD 67-72; Finklestein, Performance of Con-
ditions under a Letter of Credit, 25 CoL. L. REv. 724, 725-6 (1925) ; Mead, Documentary
Letters of Credit, 22 CoL. L. REv. 297, 298-9 (1922) ; Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in In.
ternational Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36 COL. L. REv. 1031 (1936) ; Trimble, The
Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARV. L. REV. 981 (1948) ; Comment, Letters
of Credit-Negotiable Ijstruments, 36 YALE L.J. 245 (1926).
7. Operation of the documentary credits in foreign transactions is detailed in DAviS
12-22; G iu naIGE 1-9; O'HALLORAN, THE ABC OF COMMERCIAL LLrTreMs OF CRErr
(1947) ; FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMMERCIAL LmrTERs OF CREDIT 14-24 (1930)
(hereinafter cited as FiNELsTx) ; WARD & HAP.IELD 1-19. Especially helpful in under-
standing their mode of operation are Neidle & Bishop, Commercial Letters of Credit:
Effect of Suspension of Issuing Bank, 32 COL L. REV. 1 (1932); Thayer, Irrevocable
Letters of Credit in Moden; Commerce: Some Practical Considerations, 16 CAN. B. R v.
79 (1938). See also, Harfield, supra note 4, at 299.
8. An exact sum, up to which the seller may draw, is stated. But provision is some-
times made that the credit automatically will renew itself; in that case, once An issuing
bank has been reimbursed by the buyer, seller is free to draw drafts again up to the
amount stated. This is the so-called "revolving credit." See American National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Banco Nacional De Nicaragua, 231 Ala. 614, 166 So. 8 (1936) ; Nordskog
v. National Bank, 10 LI. L. Rep. 652 (1922). DAVIs 27; GuTERiDGE 12; WARD & HAt-
FIELD 31.
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"customer," the bank promising to honor drafts is the "issuer," and the seller
is the "beneficiary."
As a rule the issuer will either notify the beneficiary directly that an
irrevocable credit has been opened or will call upon a branch or corres-
pondent bank in beneficiary's country to notify him.10 The notification form
is the "letter of credit."" Frequently the correspondent bank vill engage to
honor or pay drafts on behalf of the issuer without committing itself to any
liability to the beneficiary.' Or sometimes the notif3ing branch or corres-
pondent will be asked to "confirm" the credit.13 It is then understood that
9. The FINAL DRAFr, as all earlier drafts of Article 5, uses these generally accepted
terms:
§ 5-103(1) (d): "A 'beneficiary' is a person who, under the terms of a credit, is en-
titled to draw under it."
§ 5-103(1) (g): "A 'customer' is a buyer or other person who causes a bank to issue
a credit."
§ 5-103(1) (c) : "An 'issuer' is a bank making an engagement or giving a notice as
defined in subparagraph (a) of this Section [notice that it %,ill honor drafts]."
Other terms are commonly in use. The customer is often referred to as the "accredited
buyer or person," "consignee, .... importer" and "account." Beneficiary is often termed
"accreditee' or "seller." Issuer is frequently labeled "the opening bank" or "issuing
bank." See \VWAR & HARFIELD 21.
10. The usual practice is for a correspondent to notify the beneficiary. Sf-metimes
the customer will be authorized to notify the beneficiary, a practice once ropular but now
rarely used. See WARD & HARFILD 29-32; Invm.R's. See also American Steel Corp. v.
Irving National Bank, 266 Fed. 41 (2d Cir. 1920) (issuer notifies beneficiary directly) ;
Prehn v. Royal Bank of Liverpool, [1870] L.R. 5 Ex. 92 (customer notifies beneficiary).
11. Standard forms are set out in VRD & iLDnrrna 165, 167, 16%. 170, 171; and
'Mead, Documentary, Letters of Credit, *2 COL. L. REv. 297, 313-31 (1922). Despite at-
tempts at uniformity the forms used by banks differ widely. See VAr & HA.Mnin 156
et seq.; 1946 FEB. DRAFT 2.
12. Three distinct functions performed by a correspondent bank should he recognized
and separated for purposes of analysis: correspondent only notifies of the op.ening of the
credit (notifying or advising bank); correspondent confirms the credit (confirming
bank) ; correspondent notifies but agrees with the issuer that it will honor (accepting
bank) or pay drafts (paying bank).
See WARD & HARFILD 22-32; Thayer, Irrevocable Letters of Credit in Modcn Com-
merce: Some Practical Considerations. 16 CAN. B. REv. 79, S0-3 (193S).
The correspondent may also be asked on occasion to issue the letter of credit fur the
buyer's bank. In that case the correspondent is the actual issuer. E.g., Pan-American
Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1925).
13. The process of "confirming" a credit by notifying bank usually is done at the
request of the beneficiary, who will want a bank in his jurisdiction ts become primarily
liable on the letter. Some difficulty arises in discussions, because the English practice is
to speak of "confirmed" credits as any credit which is by its terms made irrevocable,
whereas a "confirmed" credit in the United States alludes only and specifically to thuse
credits on which the correspondent as well as the issuer is liable to honor drafts drawn
under the credit. See National Bank of Egypt v. Hannevig's Bank, Ltd., 1 Ll. L Rep,
69 (C.A. 1919) ; and discussions in DAvis 38; GtirrEmv=E 36. See also WAra, & HAn-
FiELD 170.
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the correspondent bank is accepting an additional and independent liability to
honor the drafts drawn by the beneficiary.' 4
In the "documentary" credit, the beneficiary must surrender required
documents which describe and give control of the goods to the holder in
order to receive payment or acceptance of the drafts.1 , Documents most
often required are commercial invoices, bills of lading, consular invoices, and
marine insurance papers.' 6 By contrast, in the "clean" credit, beneficiary
need present no documents with the draft.17 A credit may combine both the
"clean" and "documentary" forms by allowing beneficiary to draw a part of
the total amount without surrender of documents.1 s Most transactions, how-
ever, call for the documentary type.
14. INTER vEws. Acceptance of an independent liability by a confirming bank renders
drafts drawn under the credit easier to negotiate, for holders of drafts will have two
banks-the confirming bank and issuer-primarily liable on the drafts.
Confirmation now is rare when large United States banks are issuers or paying banks,
INTERVIEws. This also appears to be true for the large London banks. Megrah, Com-
mercial Letters of Credit, 102 L.J. NEVws 410 (1952).
15. Typically the letter of credit is an ancillary transaction to a ci.f. contract. Thus,
the documents demanded are usually those required by a c.i.f contract, although the docu-
ments may be easily varied. See DAvis 126 et seq.; FEB. DRAFT 29; Brown, Doctmenstar.y
Conditions of Payment in Conmmercial Letter of Credit, 13 TuLANE L. RV. 495 (1939).
For international practices see WARP & HARFILD 185 et seq. For the present Code pro-
visions documents in c.i.f. contracts for overseas shipments see FINAL DRAFT §§ 2-320,
2-324.
16. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRccn
FOR COmMERcIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, arts. 15-48 (rev. ed. 1951). The articles cited cover
the nature and interpretation of documents used in letter of credit financing both in regard
to overseas and inland traffic for those banks adhering to the customs.
See also Brown, Documentary Conditions of Payment in Commercial Letters of Credit,
13 TULANE L. REV. 495, 497-505 (1939) ; Comment, Descriptions in Documents Tendered
under Letters of Credit, 33 YALE L.. 651 (1924).
17. The "clean credit" is often termed an "open credit." It is used generally to cover
bona fide shipments of goods but often in speculations in exchange or in financing of a
seller who is in reality an agent for procurement of the buyer. Perhaps it is more com-
monly used by English merchants than American. See GuTmiDGE 11-12 (English);
WARD & HARFIELD 9 (American).
Actually, the so-called "red clause" credit, formerly used mainly in the Far East fur trade
and now used quite often in Australian trade, is a form of "clean" credit. INTEmVLEwS.
The seller is in effect buyer's agent going out to buy at the best price. But the buyer will
not know the documents that will be obtainable and specifications in advance. And lie
may desire to finance a trusted agent. Consequently, he will allow the beneficiary, by a
clause at one time written in red, to draw drafts under the credit, with the understanding
that documents will be sent at a later date. For problems arising under the red clauses
and variations, see WARP & HARFIELD 132-6 (a reprint of Harfield, Secondary Uses of
Commercial Credits, 44 COL. L. REv. 899 (1944) ); see also Oelbermann v. National City
Bank, 79 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 654 (1935).
18. This method of making advances to beneficiary by way of part clean and part
documentary credits is probably seen best in the variants possible under red clauses. See
WARD & HARFIELD 132-6.
[Vol. 62: 227
LETTERS OF CREDIT
Letters of credit usually permit the beneficiary to negotiate drafts, accom-
panied by required documents, to third parties.1 0 Hence, the beneficiary will
often discount drafts 20 wvith a local bank or with a notifying correspondent
bank not specifically obligated to honor drafts under the terms of the credit.2
To receive payment or acceptance on a documentary credit, the third party
will still have to present necessary documents along with the draftsY2
Advantages of Letter of Credit Financing 2
The letter of credit offers advantages to both seller and buyer. First, the
seller of goods has the primary promise of a bank,-24 rather than merely his
19. IEnmViws. The notification form typically states: "We hereby agree with the
drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders of drafts drawn and negotiated under and in
compliance with the terms of this credit that the same will be duly honored on due pre-
sentment to the drawee." See the forms of the Corn Exchange Trust Company of New
York City, on file in Yale La, Library; and standard forms in WA D & HMuuium.m 165.
20. The drafts may be drawn on the issuer, or its paying bank, or the customer.
They may be time drafts or sight drafts. When time drafts are drawn, the customer
usually is required to make funds available to the issuer by the last business day before the
drafts mature. See form for opening the credit used by the Corn Exchange Bank of New
York City, on file in Yale Law Library; W RDn & H.uuir.D 111; Continental Nat. Bank:
v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1934). Customers may make funds available
for sight drafts either before or after payment.
21. Although at one time there was a dispute as to whether the drafts could be
negotiated to anyone except a bank, the assumption now seems to be that they can be
negotiated to anyone. I-mamvws.
22. An important distinction is to be made between negotiation of drafts already
accepted by a bank obligated to accept under a letter of credit, and negotiation of drafts
along with the required documents before acceptance. The former falls under general
negotiable instruments law. Incidences are not exactly alike: e.g., it is accepted that no-
body but the beneficiary can present drafts and documents and receive payment, or have
the drafts honored before acceptance, nless the terms of the credit (expressly or im-
pliedly) so permit. See Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 App. Div. 525, 52S, 35
N.Y.S.2d _29, 832-3 (1st Dep't 1942).
23. Alternative methods of financing-cash with order, promissory notes, open or
book credit, trade acceptances, use of order bills, etc.-are compared with letters of credit
in McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HAnv. L. R-v. 539, 541. See also DAvis
13-15; VAR & HR i.LD 3-8; W.sTERFiE. oNEY CREDIT & BANKING 4,S3 ct seq.
(1938); Llewellyn, Some Advantages of Letters of Credit, 2 J. Bus.. U. oF CU. 1, 11-15
(1929); Thayer, Irrevocable Letters of Credit in Modern Commerce: Some Practial
Considerations, 16 CAN. B. Rmv 79 (1938) ; Note, 21 Col. L rvM. 176, 179 (1921).
It is the general conclusion that no alternative to letters of credit uffers to the seller
the combination of assured payment, no credit strain, and immediate paynwvnt upon
shipment. See also Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 'Misc. 431, 441-2,
97 N.Y.S.2d 779,788 (Sup. Ct 1949).
24. The letter of credit makes the issuing bank primarily liable. E.g., Decatur Bank
v. St. Louis Bank, 21 Wall. 294 (U.S. 1874) : Border Nat. Bank v. American Nat. Bank,
282 Fed. 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 701, 732 (1922) ; Pan-American Bank v.
National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925). National
banks are now unquestionably able to issue letters of credit. See Trimble, The Im;plird
1953]
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buyer, that he will be paid. -5 Consequently, he is able to enter markets where
the risk of dealing with an unknown buyer would otherwise be too great. "'
Secondly, by presenting sight drafts or by negotiating his drafts, the seller obtains
payment immediately upon shipment, freeing capital for other transactions.
Finally, he may use an irrevocable letter of credit as means of securing ad-
Power of National Banks to Issue Letters of Credit and Accept Bills, 58 YALE L.J. 713
(1949) (an effective argument that national banks have had the power to issue foreign
and domestic letters of credit since the National Bank Act of 1864, although it has been
maintained that this power came only by implication with passage of the Federal Reserve
Act in 1914). See also paper by Professor Llewellyn quoted at length in WARD & HAi-
FIELD 68-72 (national banks' power to issue derives "from the nature of the business of
banking" and does not depend on the Federal Reserve Act). Contra: FINKELSTmIN 5;
WHITAKER, FOREIGN ExCHANGE 134 (1922); YORK, INTERNATIONAL EXCUANGa 298-300
(1923) (national banks may now issue letters of credit but that power is derived from
implications in the Federal Reserve Act).
The power is specifically given to federal banks engaging in foreign transactions. 41
STAT. 378 (1919), 12 U.S.C. § 615 (1946).
Most of the states now have specific statutes authorizing state banks to issue letters
of credit, domestic or foreign, although limitations as to aggregate amounts and amounts
to any one person are typically placed upon the banks. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 96(2).
The argument that a bank cannot issue letters of credit without statutory authorization
is based on the idea that banks cannot lend their credit. 1 MORSE, BAN S AND BANKING § 65
(6th ed. 1928) ; contra: WARD & HARFIELD 72. It may well be doubted that courts would
strike down letters of credit in states not specifically authorizing their issue since such
authorization can easily be implied from statutes of the states authorizing bank accept-
ances of drafts, or from the general nature of banks as Professor Llewellyn argues. Bit
see Campbell, Guaranties and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. ot" PA.
L. REv. 261, 291-5 (1937).
25. The case law in the United States seems to view stipulation of payment by means
of a letter of credit as not relieving the buyer from his commitment on the underlying
contract should seller be unable to collect any or part of the sales price by means of the
letter of credit, unless the credit clearly so stipulates. Lamborn v. Allen Kirkpatrick &
Co., 288 Pa. 114, 135 Ati. 541 (1927) ; Dickerman v. Ohashi Importing Co., 63 Cal, App,
101, 218 Pac. 458 (1923); Bell v. Moss, 5 Whart. 189 (Pa. 1840). See also Greenough v.
Munroe, 53 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1931). And see Note, 40 HAmv, L. Rix. 294 (1926). The
Code apparently intends to maintain this rule. See FINAL DRAFT § 2-325 (2) and comment,
26. The basic object of seller is to protect himself from all the vagaries of dealing
with foreign buyers. Often buyer will be unknown. The risks are many:
"In the first place, he [buyer] may cancel . . . during or immediately after the pro-
cess of manufacture ... or after purchase to fill the order. In the second place, he may
reject the goods on arrival . . . and then use seller's necessity as a means of bargaining.
... Moreover, credit terms in foreign trade are typically long, and the absence of credit
information . . . makes the buyer's acceptance, even when obtained, no safe assurance
of ultimate payment. Finally . . . those unforeseen changes in the market from which
commercial disputes flower, and which are also a potent source both of fraud and of
buyer's insolvency, are likely to occur without notice .... [T]heir fruit is trouble, even
where buyer was originally acting in good faith." Llewellyn, Some Advantages of Letters
of Credit, 2 J. OF Bus., U. OF CHI. 1, 6 (1929).
A promise of payment from one of the large issuing banks throws the risk on the
bank. See also WESTERFIELD, MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 483 et seq. (1938).
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vances to finance his end of the transaction.2 7 Thus, the seller, in effect, often
uses the buyer's line of credit to finance a transaction from which both will
profit.
The buyer also benefits from use of the documentary letter of credit. As
a means of financing his venture the credit is cheap -8 and efficient. The issuer
extends the credit cheaply, in part, because the obligation of the buyer is at
all times secured. Once the beneficiary or any presenter of drafts has turned
over required shipping documents to the issuer, the latter continues to hold
title to the goods until their arrival at the port of destination.-0 Depending
on the arrangement between buyer and issuer, the goods may then be either
turned over to the buyer upon immediate payment, or given to him for resale
against a trust receipt 30 with the issuer retaining legal title until the goods
are sold. Thus, unless the issuing bank requires additional security, the buyer
also has the advantage of having his working capital unencumbered. He
may secure and pay his obligation to the bank out of the proceeds from the
goods.3
27. One of the most significant developments in letters of credit is their use to finance
buyer's operations. Letters of credit are not negotiable instruments themselves. But
various methods of transferring the benefits are available: (1) negotiating drafts under
the credit; (2) "red clauses" (see note 17 supra ); (3) assignment of the credit (when
permitted); (4) assignment of the proceeds; (5) secondary or "back to bac" letters of
credit; (6) general improvement of the seller's credit standing by having the assurance
of credit See WARD & HAxrILD 128-46 (reprint of Harfield, Secondary Uses of Com-
mercial Credits, 44 CoL L. REv. 99 (1944)); McGowan, Ass9nability of Documentary
Credits, 13 LAw & COxTrniP. PROB. 666 (194S).
28. Bank fees for opening the letter of credit may be as little as one-tenth of one
percent of the face amount of the drafts, and for confirming a letter of credit as little as
one-twentieth of one percent The cost will depend, among other factors, on (1) tile credit
standing of the buyer; (2) the nature of the bank's duties-whether typical or requiring
additional functions; (3) the nature of the trade; (4) distances and countries involved;
(5) the duration of the credit; (6) the amount of credit. Imnv1 ,s.
29. The bill of lading accompanying drafts under the documentary credit are docu-
ments of title. So long as the bank continues to hold the bill of lading it has control over
the goods. Thus the goods secure buyer's obligation to the bank. See Maurice O'Meara
Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 402, 146 N.E. 636, 641 (1925) (dissenting
opinion). But conservative bandng practices will primarily rely on buyer's general credit
standing or other security. IlmaVs.
FnI.L D.A.r, art. 7, codifies the law on bills of lading and other documents of title.
30. A typical trust receipt is set out in XV,% & HAI MELD 107. For a comprehensive
study of trust receipts, see McGoWAN, TrusT RrcEirrs (1947). Fxi.,N Dn.'*r, art. 9,
covering secured transactions, deals with trust receipts. It will necessitate repeal of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act wherever in force. FINAL DRArT § 10-102.
31. The buyer may delay reimbursement according to the terms of his agreement with
the issuer-typically until the day before maturity. In effect he is initially financing his
transaction by means of an ececutory contract-a step further removed than inventory
financing.
The major burden falling on the buyer is the possibility that the seller might furnish
defective goods and thus he, the buyer, will have to come foreward to litigate. But tile
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Codification of the Law of Letters of Credit
An early effort to establish a uniform system for regulating letters of credit
was made by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1933 by the publi-
cation of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary
Credits.32 Although endorsed by leading American banks, the Customs have
buyer may protect himself by requiring as a condition to honoring drafts under the credit
third party certificates of quality, signed by a person of responsibility at the place of ship-
ment. When buyer so stipulates the issuer must of course obtain such certificates if the
issuer is to be reimbursed by the buyer. See Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat. Bank,
239 N.Y. 234, 236, 146 N.E. 347, 349 (1924) ; DAVIS 9; Comment, The Rights of the Seller
under a Documentary Letter of Credit, 34 YALE L.J. 775, 782 (1925).
The buyer may further protect himself by having the credit issued for only a per-
centage of the price stipulated in the underlying contract. Complete payment would then
depend upon conformity of the goods to the contract.
32. The history of attempts by bankers to bring uniformity of forms and practices
is traced in WARD & HARFIELD 147-99. See also Ward & Rosenthal, The Need for the
Uniform Commercial Code in Foreign Trade, 63 HARV. L. REv. 589 (1950) ; Note, Re-
vised Rules for Documentary Credits, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1952).
A major step was taken when a report of a special committee of the International
Chamber of Commerce was published in May, 1930. The Seventh Congress of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce approved the report in 1933. They were published as
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COM-
MERcIAL CREDITS, BROCHURE No. 82 (1933). Many of the leading American banks adopted
the CusToMs in part in July of 1938, effective as of October 1, 1938. Only English and
Commonwealth banks, among the leading users of credits, wholly failed to adopt the 1933
CuSToMs.
But the adoption by the American banks at this stage only applied to "export" credits
-i.e., credits wherein beneficiary is exporting and the United States banks are advising
or opening credits for foreign correspondents or principals. Furthermore, the American
adoption was made subject to certain "Guiding Provisions." See WARD & HARIELD 196-
8. And the various chamber of commerce committees in some of the countries have from
time to time amended the application to meet trade practices in the particular country,
notably the United States in 1946.
In June, 1951, the Thirteenth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce
generally revised the rules to meet changing practices. INTERNATIONAL CIUAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, REvIsIoN OF THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL DocuMun-
TARY CREDITS, BRocHURE No. 151 (1951) (hereinafter cited as ICC CusTOMs).
American banks have adhered to the new rules since January 1, 1952. Twenty-nine
countries have adopted the revisions as of September, 1952. INTnmvIsws. See list in
Backus & Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credit: The Dixon, Irmoas Case, 52 COL. L,
REV. 589, 591 n.11 (1952). English and Commonwealth banks here again refused to adopt
the Customs. Ibid.
The practice of United States banks is to incorporate in their export credits a clause
making the ICC CUSTOMiS applicable. The courts give effect to such provisions. See, e.g.,
Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 850 (1945) ; Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 App. Div. 525, 35 N.Y.S,2d 820
(1st Dep't 1942).
Other less successful attempts at setting out uniform rules are detailed in WARD &
HARFIELD 147-99. For a recent example, see INTERNATIONAL CHAIMBER OF COMMRC,




until recently been utilized in the United States only for notification to ex-
porters.13 And even to the extent that the Customs are used, and despite
1951 revision,34 the provisions have proved difficult to interpret.3 " Moreover,
the Customs are rarely, if ever, used for domestic credits.3 3
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code represents the latest attempt
in the United States to establish uniform rules applicable to all types ofdocu-
mentary credits. The rules drafted were designed not only to cover inter-
national transactions but also domestic transactions. 7
In drafting this article, the codifiers worked with certain policy considera-
tions. Breadth and flexibility were necessary 3 1 to avoid undue interference
with banking practices and present international accord.3 9 At the same time,
33. Many of the large issuers in the New York area have approved the idea of
adopting the ICC CusToms for all credits, including import credits. Some actually have
begun to incorporate the provision into the import credits as guiding principles. But
probably less than half the New York banks do so. And the percentage outside the
New York area is considerably smaller. INr vmvs. See Note, 65 HAv. L REv. 1420,
1422 n.14 (1952).
34. Major revisions were made in arts. 5, 10, 15, 18, 28, and 29.
35. See in general ECA, TECH. AssisT. Div., DiscuTssoN oF PRoJEcrmD PnGAin
FOR CLASSMCATION OF IN.TE,;ATio.NAL BANKING PAcrTiCES (MUTES) (OEEC No.
31, 1950). See also Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96
N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (ICC Cvtsoms, art. 49 interprted).
36. The ICC CusToms are the chief crystallization of international practices.
For a recent extreme example of the informality of domestic credits, see Consolidated
Sales Co. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307, 68 S.E.2d 652 (1952) (first Virginia
Supreme Court case on letters of credit). And see Epps & Chappell, Assimilation of the
Letter of Credit by the Common Law, A Case of Legal Indigestim, 38 VA. L RE%. 531
(1952); Note, Letter of Credit Construed Against the Banber, 69 BANK-ING 1J. 187
(1952).
37. FINAL DaFr § 5-101, comment.
38. Flexibility is a problem for any codification. It is especially troublesome in the
field of commercial law where practices may change completely in the course of a few
years. The forms and meaning of bills of lading for example have been particularly sus-
ceptible to change. See Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifyingq Commerciat Law, 57
YALE L.J. 1341 (1948).
39. However, the objection to the Code's establishment of rules different from the
ICC CusToms on the ground that it would establish one set of rules for the United States
and another for the rest of the world does not hold up; for, as matters now stand, there
can be, and are, any number of different rules of construction in the United States,
varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and depending on local practices and terms of
the contract. And different rules are even applied to banks adhering to the ICC Cusuxns,
depending on whether the credit is "export" or "import." Furthermore, the simple addi-
tion of the phrase, "unless otherwise agreed," to the sections avoids any actual conflict. See,
e.g.. FIxAL DAFT § 5-111. In addition one commentator has pointed out:
"As long as the present 'seller's market' continues, Americans will write the terms of
,ale, and those dealing with us will necessarily become used to the construction which
we place on letters of credit. In addition, it is by no means certain that letters of credit
will be confined to international commerce. . . ." McLaughlin, The Letter of Credit
Procvisions of the Proposed Uniform Code, 63 -n v. L. R'. 1373, 1375-b (1M0).
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precision and attention to detail were requisities to clarification of the rights
and obligations of the parties. 40 One important goal was to maintain present
low banking charges by avoiding major shifts of liability from commercial
parties to banks.41 Yet this objective had to be balanced against the desira-
bility of making parties responsible for acts which they control. This Com-
ment will attempt first in a general way to examine some of the most signifi-
cant features of the draftsmanship and scope of the Code. It will then turn
to a more intensive analysis of important provisions in three specific areas
which have been particularly troublesome in letter of credit transactions:
conformity of documents; the relationship between the letter of credit and
the underlying sales agreement; and recovery of damages from the issuing
bank. The analysis should be read in the light of the unparalleled opportunity
open to the drafters to resolve present problems and to effect desirable
changes.
DRAFTSMANSHIP AND SCOPE OF THE CODE
Draftsmanship
By adopting a relatively limited number of definitions of parties to letter
of credit transactions, 42 the Code has avoided the verbal labyrinth which has
befuddled much of the literature in the field. In the past, classifications of
credits such as "import" and "export" credits, "circular" and "negotiation"
credits, and other types,48 have unduly complicated understanding of relation-
40. One of the hopes in codification of the letters of credit law was to furnish a
careful handbook through the legal maze surrounding their use. See McLaughlin, supra
note 39, at 1375.
One important function of Article 5 might have been to eliminate the present forms
used to open the credit ("requesting forms"). Typically, they are simple on the front
but contain a string of finely printed complex clauses on the reverse side. See WAIW &
HARFiELD 179-83 (standard application form set out); and requesting forms on file in
the Yale Law Library.
"An executive of an issuing bank, during the course of a conversation with the
writers, remarked that the only part of the agreement intelligible to the bank's customers
is the space provided for his signature." Neidle & Bishop, Commercial Letters of Credit:
Effect of Suspension of Issuing Bank, 32 CoL. L. REv. 1, 4 n.10 (1932) (onesidedness of
the bank forms, protecting the banks fully but not their customers, also criticized).
41. One of the prime advantages of letters of credit is their low cost. The fact that
the banks take minimal liability under the credit agreement is one of the chief factors iti
the low cost of financing, according to most bankers. INianRviWs. See WARv & HAR-
FIELD 34; Strong, Import Financing by Letter of Credit, 61 BANKERS MONThILY 439
(1944). See note 28 supra.
42. FINAL DRAr § 5-103(1) contains seven definitions indigenous to letters of credit.
They are brief and clearly worded. See note 9 supra. But see text at notes 55-6 inftra.
The conciseness and clarity of style of the 1949 D~rAr was praised in McLaughlin,
The Letter of Credit Provisions of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 1373, 1381 (1950).
43. The approach of Article 5 in terms of the operation of letters of credit avoids
the use of the following common definitions and classifications, some of which have con-
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ships among various parties.44 Except for using the terms "authority to pay,"
"authority to purchase,"4 '  and "revocable" and "irrevocable" credits,1 Article
5 avoids all classifications of letters of credit. Instead, it details the rights of
the parties under documentary credits by codification of the rights and duties
of "customer," "issuer," and "confirming," "advising, - "paying," "accept-
ing," and "negotiating" banks. But the last three terms are used by the Code
without formal definition.48 So the courts will apparently have to look to
common usage for meaning.49
By careful use of their terms, the codifiers might have been able to spell out
understandably the relationships among the parties. At several points, how-
ever, they neglected to employ terminology with precision. For e.xample,
under the definitional section of Article 5, a "confirming" bank assumes a
"direct obligation under the credit."' 0 Although certain other sections recog-
nize this obligation by placing such a bank in the position of an issuer,5 '
Section 5-116 gives a holder of documentary drafts merely the right to sue
the issuer for wrongful dishonor or repudiation. No reference is made to a
"confirming" bank. Surely a court applying the Code vould ignore the ob-
viously unintentional slip mid allow similar recovery against a confirming
fused discussion and are often inexactly used: export and import credits (see WArw &
HARFIELD 27; Mead, Docnnmcntary Letters of Credit. 22 COL. L. Pxv. 297, 299 (1922));
circular credits (see Union Bank v. Coster, 3 N.Y. 203 (1850); DAvis 24); special
credits (see Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 App. Div. 525, 528, 35 N.Y.S2d 829,
832 (1st Dep't 1942)); rcvolving credits (see note 8 supra); specially advised (see
VARD & H.%RsiELD 169); straight credits (see W.=# & HARFiax 29); negtialion
credits (see DAvis 105; WAno & HFxmLD 29) ; gencral credits (sec 1946 FED. Di.wPr 6-7) ;
packing or anticipatory credits (see GLTERImGE 13); London acceptance credits (see
SPALDING, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIG. Bats 237-8 (8th ed 1932) ); onnibuts credits
(see id. at 239).
44. The New York Bankers Commercial Credit Conference has used the various
classifications to label standard forms which were approved by the American Acceptance
Council in 1922, but which have not been formally adopted by bankers. Some of the labzls
read: Circular Irrevocable Credit; Correspondent's Irrevocable Straight Credit; Con-
firmed Irrevocable Negotiation Credit. They have, however, set a general pattern. See
NVaPD & HARFIL 11.
45. § 5-104.
46. § 5-105. See also §§ 5-106(b), (c).
47. § 5-103 (g) (customer); § 5-103 (c) (issuer); § 5-103 (f) (confirming bank);
§ 5-103 (e) (advising bank).
48. The words appear in the body of the Article: paying bank--.§ 5-107(2) ; negotiating
bank---§ 5-107(2), 5-110; accepting bank----§5-107(2).
The term "collecting bank" also slips in at § 5-110. But this term is covered in Article 4




51. § 5-111 (fraud and forgery); § 5-107(2) (reimbursement); § 5-110 (varranty
and inspection); § 5-117 (insolvency); § 5-115(2) (assignment).
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bank. But this minor slip is one of a number of slight oversights. 2 At an-
other point, the term "advising bank" is used in connection with payment
and reimbursement under the credit 53-- situations in which the term would
have no relevance if applied according to best banking usage. 4 And the
Code's definition of "customer" is so broad that it could be interpreted to
include a bank which has, for its own customer, procured issuance of a credit
from another bank.55  Since the two banks do not generally stand in
such an issuer-customer relationship, the definition may obscure their true
relationship. 6
52. See further § 5-107(1) (honor section: issuer named but not confirming bank);
§ 5-110 (warranty section: no mention of paying or accepting banks; but use of advising
bank, perhaps, to include them); § 5-107(2) (no mention of right of confirming bank to
reimbursement).
53. Article 5 refers to advising banks in the genuineness of documents (§ 5-110(1))
and insolvency (§ 5-117(1)) sections. But a purely advising bank is never involved in the
financial arrangement of credits. An advising bank does become involved, of course, when it
negotiates (discounts) drafts for the beneficiary; but then it becomes a "negotiating"
bank, a term also used by the Code. It is again involved in financial problems when it Is
authorized at the request of the issuer to pay or accept drafts drawn either on itself or
the issuer. But then the bank is a so-called "paying" or "accepting bank," terms also
used by Article 5. See note 12 supra. Article 5 seems to use "advising bank" in a
generic sense to include paying, accepting, and, perhaps, confirming bank. See broad
definition, § 5-103(e).
54. As agent of issuer, conceivably an advising bank might not be allowed to profit
from its position by discounting drafts under credits it has notified. Cf. Andrews v.
Ramsay, [1903] 2 K.B. 635. But courts have recognized that the commercial value of
advising credits through correspondents lies in the probability that beneficiary will dh;-
count drafts with the notifier. Consequently they have held that a purely advising
bank's agency ends with notification and it is then free to discount. Courteen Seed Co.
v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927). On the
other hand, when the notifying bank is one requested by issuer to pay or accept drafts
under an irrevocable credit-that is, a "paying" or "accepting" bank-it pays in full
under present commercial practice. Discounting would be a fraud on the beneficiary.
The Code should have made it clear that "advising" bank refers to a bank which is
notifying issuance of the credit but nothing more. And it should have codified the bank's
right to discount.
55. By definition in § 5-103, a "buyer or other person" causing a credit to be issued
is a "customer" under the Code. A bank requesting an issuer to open a credit for a
buyer could perhaps fall under the definition, since "person" under the Code includes
corporations.
56. Yet forms now in use by the Irving Trust Company of New York, typical of
those in general use in New York, call for the buyer to fill out the requesting application,
which is sent to the buyer's bank. This application names Irving Trust Company as
correspondent of the buyer's bank, although Irving is actually to establish the credit.
Buyer's Bank must then fill out a form entitled ArPOINTMENT IRVING TRUST COMPANY
AGENT To ESTABLISH COMMERCIAL CmaiT. The latter form assigns "as security" all
the rights of the buyer's bank under the application. It gives Irving the right to demand
additional security as it may request; and it gives Irving a lien on all of the buyer's
bank's property-including deposit balances-for the amount of any liability that may
arise under the credit. Such provisions do not jibe with making the buyer's bank a
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For a document that has undergone extensive examination and revision,
Article 5 is not well drawn. The present draftsmanship adds little to its
usefulness as a handbook of the law.37 and practices; and it may, in fact,
unnecessarily create confusion.
Scope
Article 5 is intended to cover uses of the letter of credit in domestic as
well as international transactionsrr Despite this broad scope, preoccupation
customer of the issuer under the Code. For e.'ample, under the Irving fori Irting
looks to the buyer for reimbursement initially; and reimbursement from buyer's bank
comes only in default of the buyer.
In view of the silence of the official commenLs, the codifiers probably did not consider
possible application of the definition of "customer" to the "requesting" bank (buyer's
bank). See deliberate inclusion of requesting banks in the insolvency provisions. Fu;A-.,L
DArar § 5-117.
The best view would perhaps let the definitions of the Code guide on a functiolal
basis. Irving, and all banks actually performing the duties of an issuer, are thus "issuers"
and the bayers in all cases are "customers." The requesting bank should be left to the
contractual obligation of the forms and the conmon law of agency or surctyship and
not fitted under the Code at all. With the requesting bank technique growing in import-
ance, it is unfortunate that the Code did not try to spell out the relationships to promute
understanding and prevent untoward court decisions.
The contracts employed by issuers dealing with requesting banks are aimed primarily
at avoiding the allegation that the banks are acting ultra vires in guaranteeing the debt
of another. See FINEMLSTEIN 39-40; note 24 supra.
57. One provision, however, may help by-pass a voluminous amount of confusing
literature devoted to attempting to tie the letter of credit with contract theory. Section
5-106(1) eliminates the need for consideration doctrine to establish the credit. In general,
despite early English precedent (e.g., Phillans and Rose v. Van Mierop and Hup!psim,
3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765)), the cases and some of the comminutaturo
have continued to tailor contract doctrine to cover the ltter of credit transaction. The
particular problem was one of finding consideration to support the irrevocable promie
of the bank to honor beneficiary's drafts. The better view has always been to treat the
letter of credit as a "mercantile specialty" free from contract doctrine. See discussion in
FiNm ,LsvmN 279 et. seq.; McCurdy, Commercial Lettcrs of Credit, 35 HI%v. L. Rv.
539, 564 (1922); Thayer, Irrevocable Credits i International Comincrce: Their Lejal
Nature, 36 Col. L. REv. 1031 (1936); Trimble, The Law Merchant a:d the Lettcr of
Credit, 61 HA! v. L. REv. 931 (1948). Compare Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 24b Mass.
139, 140 N.E. 803 (1923) (unilateral contract), with Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Mete. 3S1
(Mass. 1841) (third party beneficiary), with Johannessen v. Munro, 15 N.Y. 641, 53
N.E. 535 (1899) (estoppel theory).
58. § 5-101, comment.
The Code also covers to some extent the domestic use of international trade credit.--
i.e., use of the credit as a financing device by the beneficiary. Specifically, § 5-115(1)
permits unlimited transfer of the power to draw of the credit by the beneficiary should
the customer and issuer be willing to permit. This goes a step further than the ICC
CusToms, art. 49, which permits only one transfer. The presumption is against power t,
transfer unless otherwise indicated; so the Code strikes a balance between sterilizing
transfer and the somewhat exaggerated fear of free transfer. For an excellent discussion,
see McGowan, Assignability of Documentary Crcdits, 13 LAw & Cornwt. Peou. CC5
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with international practices has perhaps led the drafters to overlook some of
the implications of its provisions on domestic trade. Section 5-105 states a
conclusive presumption that a credit is revocable unless clearly designated
as irrevocable. While international credits as a rule are clearly marked as
revocable or irrevocable, 0 letters of credit in domestic transactions are often
ambiguous.0 As a result, a beneficiary or holder under him may be seriously
injured by revocation of a credit thought to be irrevocable.
Furthermore, it is possible that the beneficiary will not learn of revocation
of the credit he thought irrevocable until he presents his drafts to the bank,6t
for Section 5-106(c) permits the issuer to modify or cancel a credit deemed
(1948). The Code also follows the general trend of contract law and makes the proceeds
freely assignable. § 5-115(2). The comment to § 5-115 indicates that what is meant by
assignment of proceeds is assignment by the beneficiary of money claims that arise from
the letter of credit. Compare this statement with the language of ICC CUSTOMS, art. 49,
which refers confusingly to transfer of the credits and assignment of proceeds. Yet it is
doubtful if the Code does, or could do, much to clarify law and practice in the unsettled field.
See Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 App. Div. 525, 35 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't
1942); and McGowan, supra. Under the Code, banks may honor drafts drawn by bene-
ficiary despite filing of notice of assignment of proceeds. FINAL DaurAr § 5-115(2).
This provision, though, is sound, for businessmen will be discouraged from accepting
assignments of proceeds unless the beneficiary is known to be honest. And the provision
protects banks from the comparatively high probability of error that comes
with filing separate but controlling papers. While Article 5 does a fine job in handling
the assignment and transfer situations, it fails to treat specifically a major development
in the field of documentary credits: use of the letter of credit by the beneficiary as the
basis for opening up a second letter. By means of this so-called "back-to-back" credit,
the beneficiary is able to finance his operations. The typical situation finds the bene-
ficiary as an exporter who must buy raw material or manufactured goods without too
much ready capital. Armed with the first letter of credit, the exporter will try to
arrange with a bank in his country to open a letter of credit in favor of his supplier.
See Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779
(Sup. Ct. 1949). The advantage of "back-to-back" credits and the dangers entailed il
their use are discussed in WARD & HARFIELD 140-5.
Not much litigation has yet developed regarding "back-to-back" credits, but one
case has said that the two credits are independent, that it is immaterial that the
customer knows or does not know of the existence of the second credit, and that the
beneficiary is not transferring the prime credit. Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust
Co., supra. It is submitted that the Code should have codified these rules.
59. See forms in WARD & HARFIELD 165, 167-8, 170-1. For English forms, see DAVIS
187-8; GUTRDGE 109-112. See also forms on file in Yale Law Library.
60. For the informality, lack of clear statements of revocability, and variety of
domestic and even some international credits, see, e.g., Drink-O-Matic, Inc., v. Frank,
141 F.2d 177, 179 n.1 (1944); Lafargue v. Hanison, 70 Cal. 380, 9 Pac. 259 (1885) ;
Russell Grader Mfg. Co. v. Farmers' Exchange Bank, 49 N.D. 999, 194 N.W. 387
(1923) ; Consolidated Sales Co. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307, 08 S.E.2d 652
(1952); Foglino v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1926);
see also Bank of Italy v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 197 App. Div. 150, 188 N.Y. Supp, 183
(4th Dep't 1921) ("guarantee"). The possiblity of ambiguity in the credit is on the
increase as telegraphic credits in domestic credits become more popular.
61. See Cape Asbestos Co. v. Lloyds Bank, [1921] W.N. 474 (K.B.).
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revocable at "any moment" before payment.02 Damages consequently could
be substantial. Not only might a seller-beneficiary thus be damaged by revo-
cation after reliance, but the customer himself might be injured by a seller
who takes advantage of an ambiguously worded notification to rescind per-
formance on a contract calling for an irrevocable credit.ca
Following some precedent (14 and recognizing that revocable credits are
rarely used in practice,65 earlier drafts of the Code ran the presumption in
favor of irrevocability. 0 Moreover, one draft made bank stipulations permit-
62. The section follows United States Steel Products Co. v. Irving Bank-Columbia
Trust Co., 9 F2d 230 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Cape Asbestos Co. v. Ll-yds Bank, [1921] W.X.
474 (K.B.) ; accord. I.C.C. Crswos. art. 4. But see D.-vis 31 Gtur' iro , 34 (both
quoting the judge in the Cape Asbestos case as recognizing, despite his decision, that notice is
"reasonable and business-like").
63. See § 2-325(1) (failure to set up proper credit is a breach of contract).
64. American Steel Corp. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 266 Fed. 41 (2d Cir. 1920); sce
Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 296, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225, 237 (Ist Dep't),
modified as to damages, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926); but cf. First WVisconiin
Nat. Bank v. Forsyth Letter Co., 1S9 Wis. 9, 206 N.W. 843 (1926) (circumstances of
transaction and the general form of the credit, not merely the words, are controlling).
65. The revocable credit is typically met by United States banks in only two forms
-the so-called revocable "authority to purchase" and the "authority to pay." Under the
authority to purchase, seller draws his drafts on the buyer. Invariably buyer's bank will
instruct its branch or a correspondent in beneficiary's country to advise beneficiary that
the correspondent is authorized to purchase drafts. The correspondent, however, clearly
informs beneficiary that it may revoke its willingness to purchase without notice.
Furthermore, recourse will be had against drawer should customer fail to honor.
Thus the revocable authority to purchase is not a bank credit. NAnris "N HAnrnMu 10.
The revocable authority to pay operates along the same lines as the revocable
authority to purchase, except that drafts are drawn on the correspondent ta l: itself.
Since correspondent is the drawee, it has no recourse against drawing beneficiary once
it has paid but is not reimbursed. Not being a firm bank credit, the revocable authority
to pay is rarely used, and then, for the most part, only to cover the peried .f shipment.
IxTmvtEws. See XVARW &- HARinD 10-11, 161-3.
Revocable authorities to purchase must be distinguished from irrevcable credits
established by an issuer in which its branch or correspondent is authorized to purchase
(irrevocable authorities to purchase). In the irrevocable authority it is understood that
the correspondent has no recourse against seller (drawer) and is not entitled to discount
drafts, but must pay the face amount. These irrevocable authorities were once popular
in the Far East trade. See Bank of East Asia v. Pang, 140 Wash. 03, 249 Pac. 100
(1926); 1949 DRAFrs § 4-106, and comments; see also WAna, Bmrn CnnxzTs ,:;i
Acc=1 ,-ccEs 30, 48 (2d ed. 1931).
Revocable authorities to pay should be distinguished from the irrevocable credit
issued by issuer which permits the beneficiary to draw drafts on correspondent and which
are payable at correspondent's bank (straight credit). Issuer is liable for revecation
to the beneficiary in this situation. Correspondent bank is not. Still there will b2 no
right of recourse by correspondent should issuer dishonor vhen it presents. See furm
in WARD & HA.RFELD 67.
66. 1950 DLkr § 5-104; 1949 DpurF § 4-105; 1946 Ocr. De .r- § 3; 1946 Fr.
DAFT § 3. The 1951 draft contained the present presumption. 1951 Drive § 5-104t31.
ICC CusToms, art. 3 also states the presumption for revocability.
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ting revocation after the shipment of goods ineffective.07 These provisions of
earlier drafts appear preferable.08 Although banks control the wording of
letters of credit, the present provisions would protect them from their own
want of clarity. And although good business practice would demand that
notice of revocation be sent before beneficiary's performance,; banks are
relieved of this reasonable responsibility by the final draft.
"Clean" credits. The scope of the final draft of Article 5 was deliberately
narrowed to exclude all reference to "clean" credits 70-i.e., letters of credit
requiring presentation only of drafts unaccompanied by other documents.
Although the infrequency of use of such credits may prevent this omission
from representing too serious a defect in the Code, customers do occasionally
obtain clean credits as a means of financing their beneficiary-sellers. 1 In
view of this practical utility of clean credits, there appears no substantial
justification for their exclusion from the Code.72
67. § 5-106(2) (c).
68. See McLaughlin, The Letter of Credit Provisions of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1380 (1950) (praising change made by 1950
DRAFT in rule allowing revocation at any time before payment).
An earlier draft argues for the presumption of irrevocability: "[C]redit in a bauk's
signed promise is a word intended to be relied on. The subsection [1949 DaprAF §
4-104(2) ] therefore sets up a real burden for any issuer to lift, if he argues 'credit' is not
really intended to mean 'credit.' The issuers are the experts in the law who prepare
the documents; they are the proper ones to pick up such a burden. It is a burden simple
to lift." 1949 DaFT 4-105, comment 2.
69. See note 62 supra.
70. See title adopted for Article 5 (Documentary Letters of Credit); § 5-102, com-
ment 1.
Earlier drafts included clean credits within their scope: 1951 DRAFT § 5-104(1) (b);
1950 DRAFr § 5-104; 1949 DRAm § 4-103(b). But the first two drafts did not include
"clean" credits within their definition of "banker's commercial credits." 1946 Our.
DRAFT § 1; 1946 FuB. DRAFT § 1. It was contemplated that other sections would cover cleati
credits. 1946 OcT. DRAFT § 1, comment.
71. See, e.g., American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco Nacional De Nicaragua,
231 Ala. 614, 166 So. 8 (1936); same, 238 Ala. 128, 189 So. 191 (1939).
"In the 'clean' credit the underlying transaction is most typically an agency to pur-
chase, the beneficiary being the agent and being in a market where his purchases call
for cash. . . ." 1949 DRAFT § 4-103, comment 3. The reference is particularly to the so-
called "red clauses" used to a great extent in undeveloped regions where the market is
difficult to reach. See note 17 supra. The charges of the bank for clean credits are
higher than on documentary credits, and the bank will more frequently require the
customer to put it in funds before opening the credit. INmTvlaws. See WARD & IIAR-
FIELD 132-6.
72. A possible ground for exclusion of clean credits is the difficulty in framing a
definition which would exclude such non-commercial instruments as travellers' checks.
But see 1951 DRAFT § 5-104(1) (b). See also 1949 DRArF § 4-103, comment 3 (intent to
cover "travellers' letters of credit"). For a comparison of travellers' letters of credit
and commercial credits, see WILus & EDWARDS, BANKING AND Busimrss 275-6 (2d ed.
1925). Travellers' clean credits are much more susceptible to fraud and forgery than




The Denmand for Payment
Whenever documentary drafts are offered, 73 the issuer and its corres-
pondent must decide whether or not they will honor. Following typical state-
ments in existing case law,74 Section 5-107(1) of the proposed Code states
the general proposition that "a documentary draft which meets the terms of
the relevant irrevocable credit must be honored." The right to reject under
this section comes by negative implication: when documentary drafts fail
to meet the terms of the credit, they can be rejected, and the presenter then
will have no action against the rejecting bank.
The "credit" apparently means simply the notification to the beneficiary.7
But the serious problem arises as to what the beneficiary must do "to meet
the terms of the credit." As a practical matter, the question is one of deter-
mining how closely the documents must conform to the specifications of the
notification form.
Strict or substantial compliance.70 The negative implication of Section 5-
107(1) could easily be interpreted as requiring a strict compliance rule in
all cases.7 On the other hand, Section 5-102(2) permits reference in inter-
preting Article 5 to "uniform customs among banks."78 And in practice
banks sometimes do relax the degree of conformity they require. Under the
possible ground was the difficulty of distinguishing the clean credit from bankers' re-
mittances covered by Article 4. See 1949 Dn.Tu § 4-103, comment 3.
73. In general, no distinction will be made, or is made in the Code, as to conformity
of documents when presentation is by the beneficiary, authorized assignees, holders, holder-
banks not authorized to pay under the credit (negotiating banks), or collecting banks
(banks collecting for the account of another bank or person). But see text on fraud and
forgery, pages 252 et seq., infra, where distinctions are made for holders in due course.
74. See, e.g., O'Meara v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 3S6, 396, 146 N.E. 036, 639
(1925); Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S2d 631, 634-5
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
75. See definition, FIxAL Dauwr § 5-103(1) (a). The case law requires only that
the documents comply with the notification. E.g., American Steel Co. v. Irving
Nat. Bank, 266 Fed. 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922 ) ; Doflger
v. Battery Park Nat. Bank-, 201 App. Div. 515, 194 N.Y. Supp. 923 (Ist Dep't 1922).
76. The problem of strict or substantial compliance is discussed in DAvis 124; , ArnD
& HAIE.LD 43 et scq.; Brown, Documentary Conditions of Payment in Commcrcial
Letters of Credit. 13 TuLAN- L. REv. 493 (1939); Finkelstein, Performanee of Condi-
tions nder a Letter of Credit. 25 CoL L. R x. 724 (1925). See also McLaughlin, The
Letter of Credit Prozisions of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAnv. L
REv. 1373, 1376 et. seq. (1950).
77. This is in accordance with the general propositions of the case la%,.,. E.g., Crocker
First Nat. Bank v. De Sousa, 27 F.2d 462 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 650 (19.3) ;
Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 1S3 N.Y. Supp. 162
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 616, 132 N.E. 911 (1921).
78. See § 5-102(3): "In construing this Article reference may be had to uniform
customs among banks." Comment 4 to the Section refers to the general provisions for
usage of trade appearing in § 1-205. Comment 4 then recognizes the existence of the
ICC CUSTOMS. However, it reads: "But the document in question [ICC Cusros] has
not been submitted to the American Lax Institute nor the Conference of Commissioners
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Code, therefore, the courts may be able to ascertain applicable standards of
documentary compliance only by an extensive examination of industry
practices.
Compliance of bills of lading.70 Analysis of banking customs reveals two
important situations-both involving bills of lading-in which banks do not
and should not require strict conformity of documents. The first arises when
bills of lading do not contain an exact description of the goods as set out
in the letter of credit. Bills of lading rarely'will contain detailed descrip-
tions of the goods, since carriers refuse to inspect the goods or subject
themselves to liability by extensive representations."0 Furthermore, the
carrier does not as a rule see the letter of credit; and he cannot be ex-
pected to use technical terms. Consequently, in commercial practice, and
in some of the case law,8 ' bills of lading are given a subordinate position
in determining whether the terms of the credit have been met.82 The
invoices-and, where required by the notification, inspection documents--
are made the key to conformity.
on Uniform State Laws, and they have of course not undertaken to consider, criticize,
or revise it, nor recommend it for enactment by reference or otherwise. . . . (The ICC
CusTom s] will of course enter into any contract between parties who adhere to it . ..
and is undoubtedly excellent evidence of what banks and others concerned are expected
to do in international transactions to which it relates. But the 'uniform customs among
banks' . . . are those actually existing when the question arises, whether or not in
accordance with the provisions of any particular formulation." FINAL DRAFT § 5-102,
comment 4.
79. When ocean transportation is involved, letters of credit generally call for an
"on board" bill of lading-one stating that goods have actually been placed oil board a
ship. Because of the difficulty of designating ships in advance and the exigencles of
modern commerce, however, "received-for-shipment" bills of lading and other variants
are often substituted for the "on-board" bill when the credit calls for evidence of ship-
ment or "ocean" bills of lading. For the difficulties arising see, Victor v. National City
Bank, 200 App. Div. 557, 193 N.Y. Supp. 868 (1st Dep't 1922) (letter of credit called
for "ocean" bills of lading; reversible error not to hear evidence that N. Y. Bankers
Commercial Credit Conference of 1920 and accepted practice considered a "received-for-
shipment bill" as proper delivery); WARD & HARFIED 36; Brown, supra note 76. See
ICC CusToms, art.'19. For the problems in air transport, see WARD & 1-IARFIELD 41-2;
Sneed, A Proposed Solution to the Documentary Problem of Airborne International
Trade, 65 HARv. L. Rix. 1392 (1952).
80. See McLaughlin, supra note 76, at 1376; Border Nat. Bank v. American Nat.
Bank, 282 Fed. 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 701 (1922). See also 1946 Fuu,
DaFT-r § 14(3).
81. See Crocker First Nat. Bank v. De Sousa, 27 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir.), cert, denied,
278 U.S. 650 (1928); cf. Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146
N.E. 347 (1924) (reimbursement action) ; but cf. Lamborn v. Lake Shore Bank & Trust
Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N.Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 616, 132 N.E. 911
(1921) ; National City Bank v. Seattle Nat. Bank, 121 Wash. 416, 209 Pac. 705 (1922).
Contra: Rayner & Co. v. Hambro's Bank, Ltd. [1943] 1 K.B. 37 (C.A.). For suggestion
that English courts may require a stricter rule of conformity than American courts, ,,ce
Megrah, Commercial Letters of Credit, 102 L.J. Nmvs 410 (1952).
82. INTERviEws. But in connection with inland railroad shipments, shorthand bills
of lading under the so-called "telegraphic guaranty" are frequently the only documents
(Vol. 62: 227
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The second situation is presented when, as typically, the letter of credit
calls for presentation of a "clean" bill of lading.83 The question is not usually
posed as one of strict or substantial compliance but merely in terms of the
legal conclusions of "clean" or "foul." A clean bill of lading is one which has
nothing noted on it-as, for example, a statement that goods are damaged-
which qualifies its description of the shipment.8 4 Commercial practice has led
courts to recognize, however, that all carrier notations do not "foul" the bill
of lading in letters of credit transactions,. Federal 8 s and state8 7 statutes
validating carrier disclaimers have led carriers to print denials of knowledge
of the condition of the merchandise or content of packages covered by their
bills. And, often, written or stamped notations on the bills are merely dis-
claimers of knowledge rather than affirmative assertions that there is some-
thing wrong with the goods. In addition, many notations are such as to show
at most a possibility that the goods vzay arrive in poor condition.83 Thus.
commentators have recognized that a rule which would render bills of lading
foul, because they contained customary disclaimers or implied the existence
of possible defects on arrival, would be at odds with commercial reality.8s
One earlier draft of Article 5 met the problem of inexact descriptions in the
bills of lading head-on. It codified distinctly the working rule: when the bills
of lading did not conflict with descriptions in complying invoices or other
documents, inexactness was excused. 90 Conditions which the credit notification
required. In such cases strict compliance should be required. See Continental Nat. Banl:
v. Tremont Trust Co., 4 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1925) ; Bank of Italy v. Merchant's Nat. Ban,
236 N.Y. 106, 140 N.E. 211 (1923).
83. For an excellent discussion of clean bills of lading, see Draper, W7hat Is a
'Clean" Blil of Lading?-A Problem in Financing International Trade, 37 Com.x.E L.Q.
56 (1951). See also Brown, sipra note 76, at 499; Camp v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank,
285 Pa. 337, 132 AtI. 189 (1926).
84. "A clean shipping document is one which bears no superimposcd clauses ex-
pressly declaring a defective condition of the goods or packmging:' ICC Cusrots, art
18. See also 2 Wn.usTox, SALES- § 405c (rev. ed. 194); Draper, sutra note 83.
85. See Camp v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 132 Ad. 1S9 (1926) (evi-
dence of customary practices admitted to show what was a "clean" bill of lading). See
also ICC CUTsvos, art 18.
86. 39 STAT. 541 (1916), 49 U.S.C. § 101 (1946). See Draper, su[ra note 33, at 61;
Note, Limitations of Carrier's Liability and the Conflict of La's, 54 HAnv. L. Rzv. vo.3
(1941).
87. UNiorw Buis or L.ADING AcT § 23 et seq. For Code provio',ns, see FI:AL
DRAFT, art. 7.
88. Among the typical notations are: "used drums," "discolorcd," "necond-hand
cases," "container second-hand lumber."
89. See Draper, supra note 83, at 62-3; and alsu, Camp v. Curn Exchange Nat.
Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 345, 132 Atl. 189, 191 (1926).
90. 1946 FE. DaTr § 14(3) ("Unless otherwise agreed, the dv.criptivn may L!
contained in any one of the documents vhich are tendered"). Cf. Richard v. Royal Ban!:
of Canada, 23 F2d 430 (2d Cir. 1928); Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat. Ban!:, 23'i
N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924). See also 1950 Dp..wr § 5-118(2) (a); 1949 Di.wi
4-114(2) (a).
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did not expressly require to be evidenced by the bills of lading, or other third
party documents, were to be satisfied when compliance was indicated in the
invoice or in an accompanying statement of the beneficiary.01 The bills of
lading were thus reduced to their proper role as mere documents of title.9 '
No draft of the Code, however, has attempted to detail rules for handling
clean bills of lading. The Customs and Practices of the International Chamber
of Comnerce allows issuers to refuse bills of lading bearing any reser-
vations as to apparent condition of goods and packaging. 93 The same privilege
is perhaps given by Article 5's vague reference to "banking customs.," 4 Still
such discretion ignores the position of the beneficiary who may be injured
by rejection. A far better rule would state that unless the bills of lading
affirmatively show a defect in the goods or packaging, documentary drafts
complying with all the other terms of the credit must be honored.
Compliance of other documents. Apart from these commercially necessary
exceptions for bills of lading, issuing banks should have the right to demand
strict compliance with the terms of the notification before payment to the
holder.9 Discrepancies as to the number, character, or terms of other docu-
ments,9 6 such as third party inspection papers 97 and insurance forms, should
justify refusal to pay. But if the codifiers had desired to permit banking
practice to modify the rule, they should have made those exceptions explicit,
91. 1946 FE. DRAYT § 14(2). This is the rationale behind Laudisi v. American
Nat. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924) (credit called for "Alicinte Bouchez
grapse"; bill of lading read merely "grapes," but compliance indicated in the invoices).
See also Bank of America v. Whitney-Central Nat. Bank, 291 Fed. 929 (5th Cir. 1923),
pet. dismissed, 264 U.S. 598 (1924) (reimbursement action: mere transposition of adjec-
tives does not excuse bank).
Compare ICC CUSTOMs, art. 33 ("The description of the goods in the Commercial
Invoice must correspond with the description in the credit. Wherever the goods are
described in the remaining documents, description in general terms will be acceptable"),
with 1951 D.AFT § 5-119(2) ("Any condition . . . not required to be evidenced by
a third party document can be fulfilled by an appropriate statement of the beneficiary in
the invoice provided such statement is not inconsistent with any accompanying third
party document").
92. McLaughlin, supra note 76, at 1376-7.
93. ICC CusToms, art. 9.
94. § 5-102(3).
95. An additional relaxation of the strict compliance requirement may also be justi-
fied where the document of title offered is one superior to the one called for in the
letter of credit, e.g., a bill of lading instead of a forwarding agent's receipt. But see the
rule and rationale in an English case, National Bank of South Africa v. Banca Itallana
di Sconto, 10 LI. L. Rep. 531 (C.A. 1922).
96. Third party documents most frequently required are weighing certificates, customs
clearance receipts, consular invoices, and certificates of quality from chambers of commerce
or experts. See Brown, supra note 76, at 497; and ICC CusTo s, art, 34.
97. Inspection papers are the customer's and issuer's security that the goods are
shipped as represented; thus it is of great important that these papers when asked for
should strictly conform to the terms of the bargain. See Manatee County State Bank v.
[Vol. 62:227
LETTERS OF CREDIT
as did earlier drafts 9 8 Departure from administratively simple standards
invites litigation of the most expensive type. A troubling case in the Second
Circuit, Dixon, Irnmaos & Cia. v. Chase National Bank, illustrates the point
graphically.9  The beneficiary's collecting bank had presented a documentary
draft under a letter of credit accompanied by an incomplete set of bills of lading.
Despite the presenter's offer to indemnify the issuer for any loss it might suffer
by acceptance, the issuer refused to honor. On suit by the beneficiary, the
parties introduced high-salaried bank executives to testify concerning the ex-
istence of a custom of accepting such indemnities from "prime" New York
banks in lieu of a full set of bills of lading. In finding for the beneficiary,
the Second Circuit ignored precedent '101 and accepted the position that the
term "full set" could be interpreted by proof of banking practices.0°2 As a
result, bankers have since been concerned over the extent to which courts
may hold them to practices once thought discretionary.10 3
Weatherly, 144 Ala. 655, 659-9; 39 So. 93, 9S9 (1905). The same rule of strict conformity
should also apply where the carrier is required to certify the bill of lading.
See 1946 Fr. DAFT §§ 14(2):
"Shipping and insurance documents, consular invoices, certificates of weight, inspection
or the like, must with respect to all matters properly evidenced by such decuments,
comply strictly with the terms of the credit. But with respect to matters not currently
available for certification by third party documents the seller's invoice is sufficient.
"Other terms and conditions of the credit such as those of time, amount and the like,
must be strictly complied with."
98. Earlier drafts, for ex-ample, codified the rule that in overseas shipments any
part of the bill of lading is sufficient if accompanied by an indemnity. 1951 DRArr
§ 118(2) (b); 1950 Dp.-rr § 5-118(3) (a); 1949 DR.Ur § 4-114(3) (a). This was codifi-
cation of the practice of New York banks, which facilitates the flow of goods. However,
the practice in New York is confined to "prime" banks intcr sese and perhaps is not the
general practice over the country. Assuming, however, the practice is desirable, the
Code should have stated the rule and avoided litigation. See notes 99-104 infra.
99. 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1944). For a discussivn of the
case, see Backus & Harfield, Cstom and Letters of Credit: The Dixon. Irn:aos Case, 52
CoL L REv. 5S9 (1952).
100. A model indemnification agreement reads as follows: "In consideration of your
paying (accepting) the above described draft, we agree to pay to you for the account of
yourself and of the customer for whose account you have issued the . . . credit, as
interest may appear, such amount as will hold you and such customer harmess from all
consequences which may arise from the following discrepancies. . . .' Coi.imi-x= va:
UxN-op.i iTY I Docutmi-Ts & PRAcTicEs OF THE B,. ENs ASsOaATiO R Foar=
TRADE, EIGHTH I. Th = REpORT (Oct. 5, 1945).
101. See Anglo-South American Trust Co. v. Ube, 261 N.Y. 150, 184 N.E. 741
(1933); Kronman & Co. v. Public Nat. Bank, 218 App. Div. 624, 218 N.Y. Supp. 616
(1st Dep't 1926); Rayner & Co. v. Hambros Bank, [1943] 1 F.B. 37 (C.A. 1942);
Scott & Co. v. Barclays Bank, [1923] 2 KB. 1.
102. "In our opinion the custom under consideration explains the meaning of the
technical phrase 'full set of bills of lading' and is incorporated by implication into the
terms of the defendant's letter of credit." Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat. Bank,
144 F.2d 759, 762 (1944).
103. I,-=rEvmws. See also W.snn & HAmRFIED 4S-9; Back-us & Harfield, sutra nlut,
99, at 59; Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 144 F2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944),
19531
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The present draft of Article 5 does nothing to clarify the obligations of
banks or rights of presenters when documents are offered for payment. Al-
though earlier drafts pointed to a relatively simple and workable method of
defining proper standards for documentary compliance, the present Code falls
far short of that goal. Instead of eliminating problems, its imprecise reference
to "uniform banking customs' 1 0 4 may lead the parties into a maze of litigation,
Reimbursement
The right of the issuer of a documentary letter of credit to reimbursement
from the customer depends, at common law, upon the issuer's fulfillment of his
own obligations under the contract between the two parties.'0 5 By such a
contract, the customer undertakes to reimburse the issuer for payments on
documentary drafts which comply with the specifications of that contract. 10
But the standards for judging compliance are somewhat unsettled. Courts
seem to apply a less stringent standard of compliance in reimbursement cases
than in demand-for-payment cases.' 0 7
reverwing 53 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1944). The
present version of the Code says merely that a bank seeking honor, negotiation, or
reimbursement may give indemnities. FINAl. DAFr § 5-113. This guards against the
possibility of a claim that the bank was acting ultra vires. Id. at comment. See note
24 supra.
Earlier drafts seemed to have codified the Dixon, Irmaos rule on indemnities. 1951
DRaFr § 5-118(2) ; 1950 DRAFT § 5-118(3) (a). See also 1951 DRaFr §§ 5-123(1), (2) ; 1950
DaFr § 5-123; 1946 Ocr. DRAr § 16 (indemnity agreement inuring to the benefit of
subsequent takers).
104. See note 78 supra.
105. See, e.g., Crocker First Nat. Bank v. De Sousa, 27 F.2d (9th Cir. 1928) ; Camp v.
Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 132 Atl. 189 (1926). Frequently, this is lost
sight of in the dicta of courts. As a result there is a tendency to speak of the bank's
right to reimbursement against the buyer in terms of the necessity of the bank paying
holders of drafts under the credit. See Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National
City Bank, 6 F.2d 762, 769 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925), and FIN Ls5TIIN
149 n.9. But as Mr. Finkelstein concludes:
"The problem [of reimbursement] can be settled only by considering the relations
betveen the buyer and the bank, as distinct from those between the seller and the bank."
FINKELSTEIN 149.
The contract between the issuer and customer is normally viewed as an agreement
to indemnify and the banker must meet the terms of this contract-"letter of request"
as the forms used are called-if he expects to be reimbursed. DAvis 46 et seq.
106. See, e.g., Anglo-South American Trust Co. v. Uhe, 281 N.Y. 150, 184 N.E.
471 (1933).
107. Compare, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Lacon v. Bensley, 2 Fed. 609 (CC.N.D. I11.
1880) ; Manatee County State Bank v. Weatherly, 144 Ala. 655, 39 So. 988 (1905) ; Moss
v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 140 N.E. 803 (1923) (strict compliance for pay-
ment), with Richard v. Royal Bank of Canada, 23 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1928); Bank of
New York v. Atterbury Bros., 226 App. Div. 117, 254 N.Y. Supp. 442 (1929), aff'd, 253
N.Y. 568, 171 N.E. 786 (1930) (more liberal rule for reimbursement).
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The Code does nothing to clarify the case law. Instead, it may introduce
new problems. Section 5-107(2) states that when payment is "duly made
under the credit," an issuer or other paying bank is entitled to reimburse-
mentY 's And under Section 5-107(3), the "issuer's obligation to its customer
includes observance of customary banking practices."1u ° Certainly such
standards wiU allow reimbursement in any case where an issuer can be
forced by the Code to honor documentary drafts. But problems may arise
when an issuer honors drafts which in fact he is not compelled to honor.
Earlier drafts stated a "substantial" compliance rule: the customer had to
reimburse if, under his underlying sales contract with the seller, he would
have had to accept the documents."" Now Article 5, however, leaves open
whether strict compliance or substantial compliance shall be required.
"Payment duly made" might encompass either rule. Moreover, the provision
calling for observance of "customary banking practices" my stimulate litiga-
tion in reimbursement situations. One practice aniong large issuers, for ex-
ample, is to contact the customer and ask permission to honor documents
observed to contain discrepancies."' Should this lie treated as a "custom"
within Section 5-107(3), failure to seek such permisskn might lead to a
denial of reimbursement even where documents "substantially complied."
108. "Unless otherwise agreed an issuing, paying, negotiating or accepting bank i
entitled to immediate reimbursemcnt of any payment dfd.v made under the credit and to
be put in effectively available funds no later than the day before maturity of any
acceptance duly made under the credit." FiNAL D-rFT § 5-107(2) (emphasis added#.
The Code seems to carry over the confusion of some dicta in several cases. See note
105 supra.
109. That this language may have something to do with the problem of the customer's
rights to reject non-complying documents is perhaps not initially apparent. But com-
ment 4 to § 5-107(3) reads: "Under this subsection, the issuer and its custmer may
agree upon standards to measure the issuer's performance." The banks in international
trade usually protect themselves by setting out standards for themselves. Buried deep
in the recesses of the printed matter on the requesting forms is usually a clause reading
something like this:
"[W]e agree that any action by you or by any correspondent of yours under or in
connection with the Credit or the relative drafts, documents or property taken or omitted
in good faith on behalf of or for the protection of either you or us, shall Le binding on
us and shall not put you or your correspondent undtr any resulting liability to us; and
we agree, except as may otherwise he provided herein, to hold you and your correspon-
dent indemnified and harmless against any liability and to reimburse you upon demand
for any loss or expense including reasonable attorneys' fees, arising in connection with
the Credit." Application Form of the Corn Exchange Trust Company of New Yorl;,
d. 9. See Fixk.L DRxr'r § 107(3), comment 4 ("These agreuments %%ill be controlling
unless manifestly unreasonable in disclaiming good faith, or reasonable care").
110. See 1951 Dr r-r § 5-123 (2) : "An issuer or authorized correspondent w ho in gozAd
faith honors documents which are non-complying (a) has a right of rimbursement
against its customer if the documents are such as the customer would La obligated to
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Article 5's lack of precision and abdication to inarticulated practices in
defining the performance required of the issuer seem entirely unsatisfactory." '
Should a clearly defined "strict compliance" test be applied when documents
are presented for payment, such an administratively simple device should
also be applied in reimbursement actions.113 In fact, a similar practice is now
followed by leading New York banks, which do not attempt to obtain reim-
bursement when a customer is unwilling to accept documents containing
defects." 4 Exceptions to a strict compliance rule, if desired, should have been
clearly noted.
THE LETTER OF CREDIT TRANSACTION, THE UNDERLYING SALES TRANS-
ACTION, AND THE QUALITY OF THE GOODS
Conformity of Goods to Sales Contract
The sales transaction between the buyer and seller gives rise to the letter
of credit. But, under the case law, the issuing bank's duty to honor drafts
drawn -by the beneficiary and the customer's obligation to reimburse the issuer
are not controlled by the underlying sales contract. 15, This doctrine is codified
112. Compare the suggested presumptions in earlier drafts: for documents satisfying
credit terms in 1951 DRAFT § 5-118; 1950 DRAFT § 5-118; for duration anld expiration
of the credits in 1951 DRAFT § 5-114; 1950 DaFr § 5-114. See also ICC Cusoms, arts.
15-34 (documents), 35-48 (interpretation of terms). Codification in such detail as the
ICC Cusroms would, perhaps, have been unwarranted. Practices within the United
States vary greatly. And room for some change may be imperative in a statute difficult
to amend. But the provisions of the earlier drafts seemed to have struck a discriminating
balance. See McLaughlin, supra note 76, at 1376.
113. Commentators sometimes suggest that banks should have a broader right to
demand reimbursement than the presenter has to demand payment. The suggestion is
based on the reasoning that a bank is unacquainted with commercial terms; consequently
it has no grounds to know when discrepancies are material when asked to pay. So wheAt
it does pay, it should be entitled to reimbursement so long as the customer suffers no
actual damage. See FINKELST EN 194-5; 1946 FEB. DRAFr 17-18; (comment to § 20
which laid down a substantial performance doctrine); Brown, supra note 76, at 505;
see also cases cited, note 107 supra.
It is submitted, however, that the rule allowing reimbursement only for strict con-
formity where the bank can require it (leeway allowable on the documents of title)
would accord better with the aim of skirting litigation. The leading American banks
and their correspondents almost invariably ask their customers whether they should
pay once discrepancies in the documents have been noted. INmRvmws. This practice, which
avoids litigation, would be encouraged under a general rule of strict compliance. For
if customer consents, he will have waived his right to demand strict compliance from
the bank. See Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 120 Misc. 301, 306, 199
N.Y. Supp. 314, 318 (Sup. Ct 1923), rev'd, 210 App. Div. 179, 205 N. Y. Supp. 446
(1st Dep't 1924).
114. INTERVIEws.
115. E.g., American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat. Bank, 266 Fed. 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1920),
reheard, 277 Fed. 1016 (2d Cir. 1921), cert denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922); Jones & Co.
v. Bend, 191 Cal. 551, 555, 217 Pac. 725, 727 (1923).
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in Section 5-111(1) of the Code. Under that provision, an issuer (or con-
firming bank) "is not excused from honor or reimbursement by the fact that
the goods or documents do not conform to the underlying contract for sale,"
unless the bank contracts to the contrary. MKoreover, the "scope" section of
Article 5 declares that the Article as a whole "does not have relation to
goods."'-"
By decreasing the potential liability of the issuer and minimizing the time
required to handle letter of credit transactions, absolution of issuers from
any responsibility for non-conformity of goods to the underlying sales con-
tract reduces the cost of letters of credit.11 7 And from the seller's view-
point, refusal to allow issuers to dishonor drafts drawn against non-con-
forming goods is highly desirable. Prompt payment without dispute is often
one of the seller's chief reasons for seeking a letter of credit. 18 Should the
goods in fact be non-conforming or defective, the seller would still be subject
to suit by the buyer on the sales contract.
Adoption by the Code of the common-law rule that non-conformity of the
goods to the sales contract is no defense in either payment or reimbursement
actions thus appears justified. Even if such a defense were allowed against bene-
ficiaries, it would have to be denied against holders in due course of docu-
mentary drafts, or the usefulness of such instruments would be seriously
impaired." 9 And presentation by such holders (banks) is the most common
practice. Nor does the absence of the right to demand conformity of goods
before payment prejudice the customer. He can easily obtain analogous pro-
tection by providing in the letter of credit that third-party inspection docu-
ments (certifying that the goods comply with the sales contract) be included
among the required documents.
Validity of Documents
Should the maker's signature on a draft presented under a letter of credit
be forged, the issuing bank would have a right to refuse payment or to
recover payments from any holder other than one in due course.1- ° And the
116. FIxAL DRAFr § 5-102(1). The rights and duties of buyer and seller in regard
to the establishment of the credit as a condition of their sales contract are covered in
Article 2, the Code's substitution for the Uniform Sales Act. Fm'L DRAFr § 2-325.
117. Iix-mavinws. See WARn & HARmn 34. And see note 28 slpra.
118. See, e.g., O'.Meara v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 397, 146 N.E. 63b, 039
(1925).
119. See Thayer, Irrevocable Crcdits in Intnmational Commnerce: Their Legal
Effects, 37 CoL. L. REv. 1326, 1343 (1937).
120. Honor would not be required since the draft would not meet the terms of the
credit within the meaning of § 5-107. But the bank could not recover from a holder
in due course once payment had been made to him. Fm.m DRAF'r §§ 3418, 3417(1). See
also Price v. Neal, 4 Burr. 1335, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1761), and cases under § 62 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law; Fi.iNKELST Un 236 n.33.
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customer would probably be entitled to protection against the issuer.1 a Follow-
ing case law and typical contracts used in international trade, however, the Code
places neither an issuing nor a confirming bank under any duty to probe
beyond the face of the instruments to ascertain the genuineness of documents
accompanying a draft under the terms of a letter of credit.121 So long as
such documents are examined with care to determine that they are regular
on their face, the issuer is entitled to reimbursement.1 22
The Code does little to set out clear rules governing other aspects of
validity of documents. They can be spun out, if at all, only indirectly. Under
Section 5-111(2), an issuing or confirming bank may pay even a beneficiary
on drafts regular on their face, even though it is notified by the customer of
"forgery or fraud in a . . . document." But in such a situation the customer
can obtain an injunction under Section 5-111(1) restraining the bank from
paying anyone other than a holder in due course of the documentary draft.123
Reading both sections together, it would seem that the issuer has an option
120a. The common law would hold against the issuer should he charge his customer
on drafts upon which the beneficiary's signature had been forged. And in fact the
customer had a right to recover payments made to the issuer. British Linen Co. v.
Wilson. 4 L.T.N.S. 162 (1861). But the Code is unclear as to whether or not an issuer
could charge funds deposited by a customer or obtain reimbursement when it has actually
paid on a forged draft. Under § 5-107, the right of reimbursement is given for a payment
"duly made" under the credit. But under § 5-111, the fact that documents accompanying
a draft are forged apparently does not contravene the "payment duly made" requirement.
Since there is no reason for the bank necessarily to know the drawer's true signature, it
is possible that courts might not apply the full Price v. Neal doctrine to a forged draft.
Instead, by analogy to § 5-111, the courts might permit reimbursement when payment
is made in good faith upon the instrument. The right to reimbursement when the Issuer
has not been furnished with specimen signatures was clearly set out in 1946 Fm. DRAFr
§ 21 (b).
121. § 5-110(1). This also applies to any bank called upon to pay or accept under a
letter of credit. See, e.g., Havemeyer & Co. v. Exchange National Bank, 293 Fed. 311
(8th Cir. 1923); Bank of New York & Trust Co. v. Atterbury Bros., 226 App. Div. 117,
234 N.Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N.Y. 569, 171 N.E. 786 (1930). Further-
more the issuer and a correspondent make no warranties as to the documents except as
to their good faith. FINA DArr § 5-110(2).
The limited responsibility of §§ 5-110(1), (2) is that which is written into the
requesting forms regularly used in international trade. WARD & HARMLD 182. Compare
substantially the same provisions in ICC CusToMs, arts. 9, 11.
122. The result is achieved by reading § 5-110 with § 5-107(2) (reimbursement).
This codifies the common law rule that if the bank pays without knowledge of fraud or
forgery and there is no evidence on the face of the documents to suggest that they are
not in order, then the bank is entitled to reimbursement. See, e.g., Havemeyer & Co.
v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 293 Fed. 311 (8th Cir. 1923).
123. "[A] Court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin the issuing or confirming
bank from honoring or reimbursing unless such honor or reimbursement is demanded
by a paying, accepting, or confirming bank which has acted in good faith in reliance
on the forged or fraudulent document or by a negotiating bank or other endorsee of a
draft which is a holder in due course. . . ." FixAn DRAFT § 5-111(1).
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to refuse to pay and set up its defense of fraud or forger
" 
against any preenter
except a holder in due course. 2-4 But the issuer is in no case denied reimburse-
ment when it does pay in the absence of an injunction secured by the customer."--
The present draft's indirection may be compared to sunme earlier drafts which
positively stated the issuer's right to set up fraud and forgery.' -6
The major difficulty with the Code treatment, however, is its failure to bet
up criteria for "fraud in a ... document." Such criteria would help to settle
the problem of what evidence might be introduced or would be sufficient to
support an inference of fraud when a customer seeks an injunction.3- And
they would also help to clarify the extent to which the issuer may go beyond
the documents to set up his defense of fraud.'12
As the Code now reads, "fraud in a.. . document" is likely to cunfute rather
than aid the courts. It would probably cover the situation where documents
are fraudulently procured.2 - But how far beyond this situation the provision
would go is unclear. Case law suggests that drastic non-conformity vf goods,
such as rags for hemp,130 may in itself constitute prima facie evidence of
fraud. At the other extreme, minor discrepancies such as would amoutt
merely to a breach of warranty-absent a showing of deliberate misrepre-
124. This would follow the case law. See Szteju v. Schroler Banking C0rp. 177
Misc. 719, 721, 31 N.Y.S2d 631 635-6 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See also Old Colony Trut Ct,.
v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., 297 Fed. 152 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 245 U.S. 51,5 1024 *.
125. "[T]he issuer is excused by forgery or fraud in any rquired document fr by
a failure of title to a required document or to the insurance and is alshu xcused as
against a seller or other consignor by a non-conformity of the goods s ',ivere that it
amounts to fraud." 1950 DRAFT § 5-120. See also 1949 DzwIFs § 4-116.
126. See 1950 DRAFT § 5-120; 1949 Dnrwir § 4-116.
127. The injunction sought will usually be a permanent injunction, but on trovr
sho ing of possible irreparable loss an injunction pendente lite will be grantcd.
For typical demands, see Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 210 App. Div.
179, 205 N.Y. Supp. 446 (1st Dep't 1924) ; Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc.
719, 31 N.Y.S2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Grob v. Manufacturers Trust Co. 177 Misc. 45,
29 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Higgins v. Stdinhardter, 106 Misc. l0, 175 N.Y.
Supp. 279 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
See also Frey & Son, Inc., v. Sherburne Co., 196 App. Div. 849, 184 N.Y. Suplo. utI1
(1st Dep't 1920) (attempted permanent injunction against nego-tiation and paymnent to
third parties as well as against payment to the beneficiary).
12. See problem raised in regard to non-fraudulent discrepancie-s in U'Meara v.
Nat. Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
129. See Bank of Tawain v. Union Nat. Bank, 1 F.2d o5, ub-7 13d Cir. 1924)
(deliberate falsification, or kmowledge of falsification, of datu of transplrtatiOri could
be fraud in the documents); Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 210 App. Div.
179, 183, 205 N.Y. Supp. 446, 449 (1st Dep't 1924) (alteration of documents could b.
fraud). And see Grob v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 177 Mi-c. 45, 4tb, 2v N.Y.S2d 91(,
917 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ("If there were . . . collusion between sellers . . . and issuvrs of
bills of lading," injunction might possibly be granted).
130. Bank of Montreal v. Reclnagel, 109 N.Y. 4S2, 17 N. 217 (Ls) (rag, for
hemp); Sztejn v. Schroder Banldng Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S2d 031 (Sup. Ct.
1941) (cowhair and rubbish for bristles).
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sentation-do not constitute fraud.1 1 Earlier drafts of the Code suggested
that non-conformity of goods which "amounted to fraud"'13 2 or "a failure of
consideration"' 133 might be sufficient to establish "fraud in the documents"
as a defense to issuer's payment. The elimination of those provisions from the
present draft, however, leaves the issue in doubt.
Should the courts interpret "fraud in the documents" to include gross
non-conformity of goods, they would be letting into the letter of credit trans-
action by the back door problems relating to the quality of the goods-not
only in the injunction situation, but also in cases of issuer's defense against
beneficiaries or holders not in due course. 134 But under the circumstances the
result may be reasonable. Since the bank would in no case be required to look
beyond the face amount of documents even after notice from its customer,
it rarely would indulge in inquiry as to fraud and risk litigating the issue.133
As a rule, then, the customer himself would bear the burden of proving to
a court-in a suit for temporary or permanent injunction-such extreme
non-conformity as would amount to fraud. Most often, non-conformity would
be all he could show since the beneficiary would probably be in a foreign
country. To cut the customer off completely from this offer of proof would
be unjust. Furthermore, there is little reason to protect the seller's expectation
of prompt and litigation-free payment where his actions can satisfy a court
that fraud exists and an injunction should be ordered.
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FROM ISSUER
An issuer's failure to perform his contract with a customer may injure
both the customer and the beneficiary.136 In both cases the injured party
should be entitled to recover from the issuer for his loss. The recovery
problems under the Code differ depending upon whether the suit against the
issuer is by the customer or by the beneficiary.
Customer v. Issuer
A customer may be injured if the issuer improperly refuses to honor drafts.
wrongfully repudiates the whole transaction, or honors without obtaining
necessary compliance. Although in the last situation the customer apparently
131. See Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631,
634 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also O'Meara v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E.
636 (1925).
132. 1950 Daair § 5-120.
133. 1949 DaFiT § 4-116.
134. Since the right to refuse comes from the permissive features of § 5-111(2)'s
right to honor despite notice, the language of "fraud in a document" in that section
apparently carries over as a defense for issuer. See note 123 supra.
135. But see the criticism of McLaughlin, supra note 76, at 1378.




may refuse to accept the documents and may deny reimbursement to the
issuer,137 in no case does the Code state a damage remedy to compensate
the customer for the contract breach involved. So if the customer is to be
made whole, he will apparently have to recover on ordinary contract prin-
ciples. 1
3 s
Similarly, a customer may be injured by actions of the issuer's corres-
pondent. The Code declares that an advising bank must state the terms of
the credit correctly. 139 Perhaps this provision gives a customer the right to
recover damages against the correspondent for inaccurate notification. 140
But should that correspondent be a paying or confirming bank, the Code
states no right of action for wrongful repudiation or dishonor. A customer
who has not dealt directly with the correspondent bank may then find it im-
possible to recover damages directly from such correspondent because he
lacks privity of contract.141
MIoreover, in stating that the issuer has "no responsibility for any acts or
omissions of the beneficiary or any other person," Section 5-107(3) of the
Code -'- appears to relieve the issuer of liability for any acts of a corres-
137. § 5-107(2).
138. It may be noted also that no measure of damages or rules for the issuer is
given when the beneficiary refuses to reimburse and accept documents. For an action
on reimbursement, see Beneke v. Hoebler, 33 App. Div. 344, 58 N.Y. Supp. 16 (Ist
Dep't 1899), af'd, 166 N.Y. 631 60 N.E. 1107 (1901) (mitigation by resale not required,
since the bank does not have to "realize" on its collateral).
139. § 5-10. Contra: Scanlon v. First Nat. Bank, 249 N.Y. 9, 162 N.E. 567 (192)
(no duty to beneficiary to import any information).
140. The Code establishes liability for an advising bank "for the accuracy of its o.n
statement only." FIx.%. Dr-ur § 5-108. This liability can be interpreted to mean liability
to the customer as well as to the beneficiary. Possibly, this effects a change in the lay.
for New York See Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F2d 524 (2d Cir. 1935):
Kunlig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F2d 307 (2d Cir. 1927). Dut in
seeldng to hold a foreign correspondent where the Code would not be applicable, the
customer might not recover because of lack of privity of contract. Cf. Calico Printers'
Ass'n v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., 36 Com. Cas. 197 (C.A. 1931) (no responsibility fur
negligently reporting on the quality of the goods). But see § 1-105(2) (a) (the Code will
be applied if offer or acceptance is made in the jurisdiction in which it has been enacted).
Still the liability of the correspondent even for cases under the Code is limited to the state-
ment, unless the correspondent specifically accepts liability for other activity.
141. Kronman v. Public Nat. Bank, 218 App. Div. 624, 218 N.Y. Supp. olo (1l-t
Dep't 1926); Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners, Ltd., 25 Ll. L.
Rep. 90 (COA), aff'd, 27 LI. L. Rep. 49 (H.L. 1926) ; Calico Printers" Ass'n v. Barclay.
Bank, Ltd., 36 Com. Cas. 197 (C.A. 1931); cf. Oelbermann v. National City Bank of
New York, 79 F.2d 534 (1935); Kunlig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Lank, 20
F.2d 307 (1927); Courteen Seed Co. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y.
277, 157 N.E. 272 (1935).
142. ICC CusToms, art. 14: "Banks utilizing the services of another Bank asume
no liability or responsibility (unless they themselves are at fault) should the instructiuns
they instruct not be carried out exactly, even if they have themselves taken the initiative
in the choice of their correspondent."
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pondent bank-perhaps even the issuer's foreign branch.143 The issuer is, then,
seemingly absolved from any liability should its correspondent misstate the
terms of the letter of credit to the beneficiary or refuse to honor complying
drafts.144 This is true although the issuer may have chosen the correspondent
without prior arrangement with the customer and although the issuer may
derive some benefit in establishing a business relationship with the corres-
pondent.1 45
Thus under the Code, the customer may find himself wholly unable to recover
damages.140 Or at best he may be forced to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction
against an unknown bank. Yet the damage actually suffered by the customer
may be severe. The correspondent's actions may even given the beneficiary a
chance to repudiate his underlying sales contract with the customer for the
latter's failure to establish and receive payment under a proper credit.147 A
more desirable rule would make the issuer clearly responsible for acts of its
branches, and at least for acts of correspondents not dealing directly with
the customer. The issuer could then recover his loss from the correspondent.
Beneficiary v. Issuer
A beneficiary may recover damages from an issuer where the latter has
improperly dishonored drafts or, prior to the presentation of drafts, has
wrongfully repudiated its obligations under the irrevocable letter of credit.
143. Earlier drafts included a statement that issuer was liable for the acts of its
own branches, but this was deliberately deleted. See 1951 DAFrT § 5-112; 1950 DRAIr
§ 5-112; 1949 DRAFr § 4-109.
144. § 5-107(3). Compare with THE BA-ic COLLECrioN Coun § 2's codification of
the so-called "Massachusetts" rule that each bank is responsible for its own negligence
but not for the negligence of any other bank along the collection process. See also FINAL
D~rA § 4-202(3).
145. Often seller will stipulate with buyer for confirmation by a particular bank in
his country, in which case buyer will make arrangements with issuer for confirmation
by that bank. Confirming bank will charge a fee to the issuer, who will in turn charge
the buyer. As a rule, when mere notification is desired, the seller will not designate a
particular bank. And buyer will then normally not specify any particular bank of notifiea.
tion. Issuer will be free to choose the notifying bank, which may in fact be its own
branch. INTERviEws. For an instance where the customer nominated the notifying cor-
respondent bank, see Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners, Ltd., 25
Ll. L. Rep. 90 (C.A.), aff'd, 27 LI. L. Rep. 49 (H.L. 1926); and where the issuer
advised through its own choice of correspondent, Oelbermann v. National City Bank of
New York, 79 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1936). See generally DAVIs 92 el seq.
146. Despite the fact that the issuer is not liable for actions of the correspondent,
it does not follow that the issuer is entitled to reimbursement when it has received non-
complying documentary drafts from its correspondent. Payment would not seem to be
"duly made" to the correspondent bank under § 5-107(2). See Equitable Trust Co, of
New York v. Dawson Partners, Ltd., 25 Ll. L. Rep. 90, aff'd, 27 LI. L. Rep. 49 (H.L.
1926) (permitting customer to refuse).
147. See FiNAL DRAFr § 2-325(1). See also Obrecht v. Crawford, 175 Md. 385, 2
A.2d 1 (1938).
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Under either type of case, problems are raised as to whether there is a duty
to mitigate and whether incidental damages will be allowed.
WVrongful dishonor of drafts. Under American case law a heneficiarv'
measure of damages for wrongful dishonor of drafts is usually held to be the
same as a seller's damages upon a buyer's breach of contract.1,s Where the
beneficiary resells the goods (or documents of title), he is allowed the dif-
ference between the amount of the dishonored draft and the proceeds of the
sale, plus any incidental expenses incurred.' 49
Some American cases speak of the duty to mitigate damages, where possible,
by resale.150 Several English cases flatly deny this duty, and would always
allow the beneficiary to recover the face amounts of the drafts with incidental
expensesY'5 These decisions are based on the rationale that one of the objects
of letters of credit financing is the certainty of obtaining the face amount of
tendered drafts without controversy.'M Clearly whatever the view, the bene-
ficiary is awarded damages for his reasonable incidental expenses. 1*3 He is
not restricted to mere recovery of the face amount of the drafts.
Code treatment of damages seems to light on a mongrel rule. Section 5-
116(1) states that the issuer is liable to the holder for the face amount of
the drafts and stands, with respect to documents, in "the position of a seller"
under Section 2-707 of the Code. Section 2-707 permits "a person in the
position of a seller" to resell the goods. M4 or, in this case, apparently either
148. See, e.g., Riggs v. Lindsay, 7 Cranch 500 (U.S. 1813); De Sousa v. Crodcer
First Nat. Bank, 23 F.2d 118 (N.D. Cal. 1927), rced on other grotn:ds, 27 F2d 462
(9th Cir. 1928).
149. E.g., De Sousa v. Crocker First Nat. Bank, 23 F.2d 118, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1927),
rez,'d on other grounds. 27 F2d 462 (9th Cir. 1928). Accord: In re Barncd's Barling
Co., Coupland's Claim, L.R. 5 Eq. 167 (1869).
150. See. e.g.. O'Meara v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 3S6, 400, 14b N.E. o6,
640 (1925). But cf. Huber & Co. v. Lalley Light Corp., 242 Mich. 171, 218 N.W. 793
(1928) (reimbursement action against customer; bank does not have to resell-i.c.,
"realize on security").
151. See Stein v. Hambro's Bank, 9 LI. L. Rep. E07 (1921), rcv'd on other graunds,
10 Ll. L. Rep. 529 (C.A. 1922) ; Belgian Grain & Produce Co. v. Cox & Co., I LI. L.
Rep. 256 (C.A. 1919).
152. See Belgian Grain & Produce Co. v. Cox & Co., I Ll. L. Rep. 251 (C.A.
1919).
153. See, e.g., Riggs v. Lindsay, 7 Cranch 500 (U.S. 1813). And see De Sousa v.
Crocker First Nat. Bank, 23 F.2d 118, 122 (N.D. Cal. 19-7), re-d on othcr grou:ds,
27 F2d 462 (9th Cir. 1928); In re Barned's Banking Co., Coupland's Claim, LR. 5 Eq.
167, 169 (1S69). But note the distinction when the draft drawn under the credit is
accepted and then dishonored. This situation presumably would fall under the regular
rules of negotiable instruments, where the holder would be entitled to claim only the
money value stated on the instrument, interest from the time of presentment for pay-
ment, and expenses of notice and protest. See DAvis 1204. See also, for Cude prvisiuns
related to rights and duties after non-payment of accepted drafts, FnINA. DnAIr § 3-122
(accrual of cause of action and interest).
154. § 2-706 (to which § 2-707 makes referuece). Section 2-707 also gives the persun in
the position of a seller a right to stoppage in transit by referral to § 2-705.
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
goods or documents of title. He can also recover such incidental damages as
are commercially reasonable-storage charges, transportation charges, and
the like.1 55 Consequently, the holder seems to have the choice of suing issuer
for the face amount of the draft and turning documents over to the court, or
selling the documents and recovering the difference between the proceeds of
the resale and the face value of the draft. There is apparently no duty to
resell. 150 But in fact Article 5 will force such resale in most instances. For
Section 5-116(3) limits "recovery" to the face amount of the draft.157 Thus
in a suit on the draft for its face amount, incidental expenses would be excluded.
Apparently the Code is attempting to lay down the rule that issuer's lia-
bility is not to exceed the sum written on the face of the draft.'0 8 Thus if
the holder actually resells to a third person, he may still sue the issuer and
recover the difference between the proceeds of the sale and the amount of
the draft plus expenses. Total recovery from all sources may then exceed the
face amount of the draft, but the amount recovered from the issuer will not ex-
ceed the face amount of the draft. Since the holder will almost invariably
desire to recover incidental damages, which are usually substantial in overseas
shipments, he will have to resell.
Perhaps the Code should require the holder to mitigate his damages by
attempting to resell.1 9 But a barely decipherable indirect method is hardly
the way to impose the obligation. And the present rule may cause the holder
injury if he is unable to resell or if the total loss suffered exceeds the sum
of resale proceeds and recovery on the draft. Furthermore, the issuing bank
on a literal interpretation of Section 5-116(3) need pay no interest from the
date of wrongful dishonor when the holder sues for the face amount of the
draft. The Code attempts to justify the limitations by stating that "public
policy requires that liabilities of banks be definite and knowable." 1°0 This
policy is probably predicated upon the fear that extended liability may jeopar-
dize existing low rates. But, in fact, present rates are set without such
155. § 2-710 (by referral from § 2-707).
156. The resale section (§ 2-706) is phrased permissively. See 1946 FEiD. D rAF
§ 10 ("The beneficiary is under no duty to mitigate"--this provision was bracketed for
possible inclusion). But see text at note 160 infra.
157. "In no event shall recovery exceed the amount of the credit or the draft as
the case may be." FINAL DRAr § 5-116(3). See 1951 DRAFr § 5-124 (substantially the
same provisions of FINAL DRAFT §§ 5-116(1), (2), but no limitation of "recovery") ;
1950 DAr § 5-124 (states only a liability "to any aggrieved party for the face amount
of the draft" without mention of the right to be in the position of a seller); 1949
DRAFr § 4-125 (holder's rights "with respect to any goods" are those of a seller after
"total breach" of a contract).
158. "Subsection (3) states the limit of the issuer's liability. Issuers of credits are
generally banks; public policy requires that the liabilities of banks be definite and know-
able; therefore damages exceeding the amount of the draft or of the credit are forbidden."





limitation of liability. And since denial of incidental damages may merely
shift loss from the party responsible for that loss to an innocent one, there
appears to be a more compelling public policy for granting full recovery. There
is certainly strong public policy for stating clearly what is intended.
Repudiation. An issuing bank may attempt to repudiate its obligations
under a letter of credit. It may explicitly assert its repudiation of the whole
credit ;",' or it may dishonor one draft under such circumstances as to in-
dicate an intent to repudiate the entire credit.1 62
Section 5-116(2) of the Code sets out an "immediate right of action" for
the beneficiary when an issuing bank repudiates an irrevocable credit.' C3
His remedies against the bank, the section further suggests, are the same
as those which a seller would have against a repudiating buyer under Article
2 of the Code."" But by its cross-referencing, Article 5 creates uncertainty
as to whether all the seller's damage measures are available to the beneficiary.
The primary remedy of the Code, resale after breach accompanied by re-
covery for actual loss, is clearly available by direct reference in the body
161. See Foglino v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't),
vwdified, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926). See also Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands
Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ("suit for anticipatory breach").
162. See Urquhart, Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank, [1922] 1 K.B. 318, 323.
163. Section 5-116(2) speaks of repudiation without further elaboration. There is
no problem as to the applicability of the section when the issuer flatly states his repudiation
of the letter of credit. Nor is there difficulty when the issuer rejects one draft covering
the face amount of the letter of credit under such circumstances as indicate an intent to refuse
ever to honor; for, in this event, the beneficiary may treat it as a wrongful dishonor
under § 5-116(1).
Difficulty arises when a letter of credit calls for a series of drafts, one of which is
rejected outright or wrongfully dishonored. The analogy is to the installment contract;
and, in fact, the credit will in these instances usually arise from an installment s-ales contract.
Section 5-116(2) does not refer directly to the installment breach section, § 2-612.
It does, however, refer to § 2-610 (anticipatory breach section), which sets up its own
criterion for outright repudiation of a performance and refers to § 2-612, which sets up
adequate standards of materiality to cover the wrongful dishonor situation. Cf. Do2lger
v. Battery Park Nat. Bank, 201 App. Div. 515, 194 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1st Dep't 1922)
(installment contract covered; repudiation five days before credit expires; damage issue
decided on the basis of repudiation of whole credit at expiration date rather than on the
basis of "anticipatory breach").
164. "If an issuing bank repudiates an irrevocable credit, the beneficiary has an
immediate right of action and with respect to any documents may proceed like a
seller after repudiation by the buyer (Sections 2-610, 2-611, and 2-703 through 2-70G)!'
FN.AL DRT § 5-116(2).
The ambiguity of § 5-116(2)'s use of the terms "vith respect to any documents" is
partly clarified by a comment to the section, which states that it applies to the "goods"
represented by the documents. FINAL DRAFT § 5-116, comment 2. Consequently, it does
not appear to matter, for the purpose of the remedies given, that docui:tents are, or
ever will be, in existence. This conclusion is further strengthened by the referral in
§ 5-116(2) to § 2-610, which sets out the remedies for "anticipatory repudiation." See
FINAL DaJwr § 2-610, and comments thereto.
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of Section 5-116(2) to relevent sections of Article 2.115 Thus, when goods
have been identified to the letter of credit transaction, the beneficiary can
resell those goods and recover the difference between the face amount of the
credit and the resale price 10 plus incidental expenses.10 And if goods are
unfinished or in the process of procurement, he can ready them for resale,
so long as in sound business judgment completion would not materially in-
crease his damages.' 08 Moreover, under the resale provision, if goods are
not in existence, the beneficiary may recover the difference between the face
amount of the letter of credit and the sale price under a new contract which
he enters to cover the same goods.'0 9
But it is uncertain whether the drafters of Article 5 intended to give
beneficiaries three other alternative measures of damages open to sellers
after buyer repudiation: (1) the general damage measure for "non-accept-
ance"-the difference between the letter of credit price and the market price of
the goods;170 (2) the profit, measured by the difference between the face
amount of the letter of credit and expenses ;171 or (3) the price, i.e., the face
amount of the letter of credit. 17
2
Doubt as to the availability of these alternative damage measurements stems
from the Code's draftsmanship. In enumerating the sections of Article
2 under which the beneficiary may "proceed like a seller," Section 5-116(2)
does not refer directly to Sections 2-708 and 2-709,173 which provide for
165. § 2-706. See also § 2-703 ("index section" of all seller's remedies) ; and
§ 2-610 cross-referencing to § 2-703).
The beneficiary is also explicitly given the power to stop in transit (§ 2-705).
166. § 2-706(1).
167. Ibid. (referring in the text specifically to the right to incidental expenses under
§ 2-710). Any expenses saved in consequences of the issuer's breach must be deducted.
§ 2-706(1).
168. § 2-704.
169. § 2-706(2) ("The resale must be reasonably identified as referring to the broken
contract"). See also § 2-706, comment 6 (subsection (2) applies to "anticipatory breach").
170. See Foglino v. Webster, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878, modifying 217 App. Div.
282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1926). The Court of Appeals awarded the beneficiary
the difference between the amount stated on the letter of credit and the market price. The
lower court had allowed a measure based on the difference between the amount of the credit
and the amount which the beneficiary had contracted to pay his supplier. Since tile market
had dropped considerably below the price which beneficiary had agreed to pay hh,
supplier, the beneficiary recovered much more under the Court of Appeals' measure. For
a thorough analysis of the damage measures for "non-acceptance," see Comment,
Remedies for Total Breach of Contract under the Uniform Revised Sales ,'let, 57 YALI:
L.J. 1360, 1370-7 (1948). See also FINAL DaF-T § 2-708, and comments thereto; and
note 181 infra.
171. The profit measure is also considered a measure for "non-acceptance." See
FIiAL. DaFr § 2-708; UMIFORUA SALEs Acr § 64(3), as interpreted in Torkonian v.
Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 Atl. 760 (1916), 120 A.L.R. 1189 (1939). See note 181 inlra.
172. See FINAL DRAFT § 2-709. See discussion of the price action in Comment, 57
YALE L.J. 1360, 1369-70 (1948).
173. See note 164 supra.
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the three alternative measures to the resale measure of damages. But Section
5-116(2) does refer directly to an "index section," 174 which gathers together
in one place "all the remedies open to a seller for any breach by the buyer."
Incorporated in that index section are references to the remedies of both
Sections 2-708 175 and 2-709.176 However, reference is also made in the index
section to the resale sections 177 and two other sections, 2 8 to which specific
cross-references are made in the body of Section 5-116(2).70 So a court,
seeking to divine the drafters' intent, might with almost equal force support
a decision either to grant or to deny the remedies of Section 2-703 and 2-709
to a seller injured by a repudiation of a letter of credit.
Should the courts interpret Section 5-116(2) of Article 5 as excheding the
remedies of Sections 2-703 and 2-709, the resultant denial of profit and price
actions might seriously injure some seller-beneficiaries. When resale is im-
possible, recovery of the price may be essential to compensate the injured
seller.' s0 And lost profit is the only measure which would allow recovery
for loss when the beneficiary resells goods which, for all practical purposes,




177. § 2-706. See incorporation in § 2-703(d).
178. §2-704 (right to identify goods to the contract); § 2-705 (stoppage in transit 1.
See incorporation in §§ 2-703(c), (b), respectively.
179. Note, too, that § 2-610 establishes seller's remedies for breach by referring to
the "index" section, § 2-703, without the further dtailing of § 5-116(2). Likewise it
refers only to the "index section" for buyer's remedies. § 2-711. See Final Dr,'r
§ 2-610.
180. The beneficiary may find it difficult to sell his %%ares at a commercially
reasonable price; rather than chance resale at a low price and subject himself to the
objection that his resale did not meet the standards sut out by § 2-706(1), he may
hold on to the goods. F_xclusion of the price measure, consequently, may force the
wronged seller into a position of selling in such a way as to east doubt under normal
circumstances on his good faith. See the discussion of the "complementary" nature
of the price action to resale in Comment, 57 YALS LJ. 13t), 13G9 (194).
181. Under § 2-70g the first measure for "non-acceptance" is contract less market
price at time and place for tender (or in the case of "anticipatory repudiation," the time
of learning of the repudiation, if trial occurs before the time of completed performance
-see § 2-723(1)). Absence of this measure should not greatly disturb the bmeficiary;
for if he can establish a market price, he can usually resell. However, it do.s eliminate
one advantage the seller might have-i.e., the opportunity to establish the market price
for the purposes of the suit, to hold on to the goods nonetheless, gambling on a rise in
the market to enable him to sell at a higher price later.
The measure of contract less expenses (the "profit") comes into play only whtn the
first measure fails to put the seller in as good a position as performance. FI::AL DrP.Mn
§ 2-703. The comment for § 2-703 indicates that the codifiers had the "automobile casvs"
particularly in mind-i.e., where resale is at the contract price on standard items. But
it has been aptly shown that whenever an item of unlimited supply is resold abfive the
point at which the seller makes a profit, the contract-less-expenses measure is a truer
1953]
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On the other hand, even if Sections 2-708 and 2-709 are interpreted as
applicable, the face amount of the credit (the price) may not provide an
adequate remedy where resale of goods is impossible, for incidental damages
will be denied under the provision in Section 5-116(3) limiting recovery from
an issue to the face amount of the credit.' 82
The rights to recovery of a beneficiary injured by the repudiation of an
issuer are thus obscured by the draftsmanship of Article 5. And even the
interpretation most favorable to the beneficiary would not allow recovery
of incidental damages under some conditions. Such denial of full compensation
appears unjustified. Having assumed a primary obligation to the beneficiary,
an issuer should either satisfy its obligations properly or bear full liability
for the results of its own misconduct. One of the main purposes of the
beneficiary in seeking a letter of credit is to receive assurance of payment
from a reliable bank. 83 From the bank he expects to receive payment; from
it, he should recover judgment for his full injury.
CONCLUSION
No statute can perhaps satisfy all opinion. Nor can any draftsman hope
to settle all questions. And few statements of law can be so worded that
they are not open to varying interpretations. Nonetheless, bankers, business-
men, and lawyers might have hoped for a more distinct set of working rules
than the present draft of Article 5 offers. Inexact use of terms seems to mar
the clarity of its functional approach. Ambiguity in important provisions may
even cause undesirable litigation. Too many rights and obligations are left
to the vagaries of "banking customs." Issuing banks seem to be unduly
insulated from liability. Although the mere decision to codify the law of
documentary credits should be a contribution, the final draft does not do
full justice to the time and effort expended during the drafting process.
tally of the seller's loss than is the contract-less-market measure. See Comment, 57 YALE
LJ. 1360, 1371-6 (1948). The present wording of the relevant comment to § 2-708
seems aimed at broad application of the "profit" measure. See FxN,A DRAFr § 2-708,
comment 2. For previous use of the "profit" measure, see, e.g., Torkomian v. Russell, 90
Conn. 481, 97 Atl. 760 (1916); Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 624, 218 Pac. 959 (1923)
(interpreting "special circumstances" of UxiFoRm SALES Ac" § 64(3) to include the
"profit" measure). Contra: e.g., Charles St. Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 312 Mass. 624, 45
N.E.2d 928 (1942). For a use that would have awarded less damages in a letter of
credit case, see Foglino v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282, 216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't),
)nwdified, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926); note 170 supra.
182. See text at notes 159-60 supra.
183. See text at notes 24-7 supra.
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